China–Japan Relations - Wikipedia

This article is about relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan. For historical relations between imperial China and imperial Japan, see History of China–Japan relations. For relations between Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan), see Japan–Taiwan relations. Bilateral relationsChina–Japan relations

China	Japan
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of China, Tokyo	Embassy of Japan, Beijing
Envoy
Ambassador Wu Jianghao	Ambassador Kenji Kanasugi

Embassy of Japan, BeijingEmbassy of China, Tokyo

The relationship between China and Japan spans thousands of years. Japan has deep historical and cultural ties with China; cultural contacts throughout its history have strongly influenced Japan – including its writing system, architecture, cuisine, culture, literature, religion, philosophy, and law.[1] China, in return, has been considerably influenced by Japan. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Empire of Japan embraced Westernization and saw the Qing dynasty as "non-Chinese", leading to the First Sino-Japanese War where Japan emerged victorious and gained control of Taiwan. In the 20th century, Japan pursued an increasingly expansionist policy towards China. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo, and invaded other parts of China in 1937, precipitating the Second Sino-Japanese War which was marked by numerous Japanese war crimes. Japan surrendered in 1945, leading China to regain all lost territories. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, relations were tense, with Japan continuing to recognize the Republic of China which had retreated to Taiwan, though informal ties with the PRC existed.

Japan normalized relations with the PRC in 1972 with the Japan–China Joint Communiqué, recognizing PRC as the only legitimate representative of China. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China was signed in 1978. During this time, trade between the two nations grew significantly. Relations further improved when Japanese emperor Akihito visited China in 1992 and Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement in 1995 apologizing for Japan's actions during World War II. Ties between the two nations deteriorated after anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005. The 21st century marked a changing balance of power between the two countries; Japan's economy stagnated following the Lost Decades that started in the 1990s, while China's economic and military power grew significantly after the beginning of reform and opening up in 1978. In 2010, China's economy overtook Japan. Relations deteriorated in 2012, triggered by the Japanese government's purchase of the disputed Senkaku Islands from their private owner, which led to anti-Japanese protests. Relations started to improve in the late 2010s and 2020s, but deteriorated in 2025 and 2026 after comments made by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi regarding a potential defense of Taiwan.

In contemporary times, China and Japan are among the world's largest economies and major trading partners, with bilateral trade reaching $322 billion in 2025; China has been Japan's largest trading partner since 2005. China is the largest source of tourists and foreign students to Japan. Despite strong economic ties, relations are strained by geopolitical disputes, wartime history, and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute, which is administered by Japan but claimed by China. Additionally, Japan's security concerns over Taiwan, controversies over Japan's wartime actions including the Nanjing Massacre and Unit 731, visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, and differing historical narratives continue to fuel tensions. Public opinion surveys show that overwhelming majority of people in both countries have negative views of each other. While efforts have been made to improve relations, longstanding disagreements remain.

History

[edit]

Background

[edit] Main articles: History of China–Japan relations, First Sino-Japanese War, Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and Second Sino-Japanese War

China and Japan are geographically separated only by a relatively narrow stretch of ocean. China has strongly influenced Japan with its writing system, architecture, culture, religion, philosophy, and law. For a long time, there was trade and cultural contacts between the Japanese court and the Chinese nobility.[citation needed]

When Western countries forced Japan to open trading in the mid-19th century, Japan moved towards modernization (Meiji Restoration), viewing the Qing dynasty as an antiquated civilization, unable to defend itself against Western forces in part due to the First and Second Opium Wars along with the Eight-Nation Alliance's involvement in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion.[citation needed]

As a result of Japanese war crimes during the Second Sino-Japanese War such as the Nanjing massacre, and the Chinese view that Japan has not taken full responsibility for them, the bilateral relationship between China and Japan continues to be a sensitive issue in China.[2]: 24 

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China

[edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding missing information. (December 2025)

Normalization

[edit]

In December 1971, the Chinese and Japanese trade liaison offices began to discuss the possibility of restoring diplomatic trade relations, and in July 1972, Kakuei Tanaka succeeded Eisaku Satō as the new Japanese Prime Minister.[3] Tanaka assumed a normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations.[3] Furthermore, the 1972 Nixon visit to China encouraged the normalization process.[3] The normalization process was eased in part because PRC and Japan had maintained unofficial trade and people-to-people exchanges.[3]

A visit by Tanaka to Beijing culminated in the signing the Japan–China Joint Communiqué on September 29, 1972, which normalized diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC.[3] Japan stated that it was aware of its responsibility for causing enormous damage to the Chinese people during World War II and China renounced its demand for war reparation from Japan.[3] Avoiding political disputes over this traumatic history facilitated immediate strategic cooperation.[3] The Japanese agreed with the Chinese view on the political status of Taiwan, namely "that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."[3]

On 5 February 1973, China and Japan agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations.[4] Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty began in 1974, but soon broken off in September 1975. China insisted the anti-hegemony clause, which was directed at the Soviet Union, be included in the treaty. Japan objected the clause and did not wish to get involved in the Sino-Soviet split.[citation needed] Talks on the peace treaty were resumed in July 1978, and the agreement was reached in August on a compromise version of the anti-hegemony clause.[5] The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China was signed on August 12 and came into effect October 23, 1978, under the two leaders of Deng Xiaoping and Takeo Fukuda.[citation needed]

1980s

[edit]

The 1980s were a high point of China–Japan relations, and Japan pursued a strategy of "Friendship Diplomacy" with China.[6]: 141  The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Yaobang, visited Japan in November 1983, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone reciprocated by visiting China in March 1984.[citation needed]

Economic issues centered on Chinese complaints that the influx of Japanese products into China had produced a serious trade deficit for China. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders tried to relieve above concerns during visits to Beijing and in other talks with Chinese officials. They assured the Chinese of Japan's continued large-scale development and commercial assistance, and to obstruct any Sino-Soviet realignment against Japan. The two countries also concluded a bilateral investment treaty in 1988 after seven years of tough negotiation, where China finally agreed to grant Japanese investments with "national treatment".[7] In the late 1980s, China and Japan began cooperation on environmental matters.[8]: 62  After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, Japan called the response "intolerable" and froze loans to China.[9][10]

1990s

[edit]

In 1990, Japan became the first member of the G7 to restore high level relations with China.[9][10] On 10 August 1991, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu became the first among major developed Western countries to visit Beijing.[11] On 6 April 1992, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin visited Japan.[12] In October 1992, Japanese emperor Akihito visited China, the first visit to China by a Japanese emperor. The visit marked a significant improvement in the relationship.[13] Relations were further improved when Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama visited China in May 1995, where he visited the Marco Polo Bridge and the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the first Japanese prime minister to do so. He also issued the Murayama Statement in August 1995, in which he apologised for the Japan's actions during World War II, an act that was highly appreciated in China.[14] On 29 August, the Japanese government protested China's nuclear test and announced the freezing of government loan aid to China.[11]

Bilateral structural change developed during the late 1990s to 2004. Japan had been investing in China during the early 1990s, and trade decreased during the late 1990s, but resurged at the millennium. The resurgence might have been because of the prospect of China becoming a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China and Japan engaged in moderate bilateral cooperation throughout the 1990s and 2000s.[8]: 51  Continuing the bilateral cooperation on environmental matters that began in the late 1980s, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Centre for Environmental Protection was established in 1996.[8]: 62  In 1998, Jiang Zemin visited Japan, where the two nations announced a "friendly cooperative partnership dedicated to peace and development".[12]

21st century

[edit]

2000s

[edit]

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Beijing in October 2001, where he visited the Marco Polo Bridge and the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, expressing remorse and apology for Japan's history of aggression against China. However, Koizumi later undertook six visits to the Yasukuni Shrine during his six years as Prime Minister of Japan damaging the relationship. Trade increased during this time, leading to the coining of the phrase "cold politics, hot economics".[11]

In early 2005, Japan and the United States had issued a joint statement which addresses issues concerning the Taiwan Strait.[15] China was angered by the statement, and protested the interference in its internal affairs.[16] The Anti-Secession Law was passed by the third session of the 10th National People's Congress, and was ratified in March 2005, and then the law went into effect immediately. Subsequently, anti-Japanese demonstrations took place simultaneously in China and other Asian countries.[citation needed]

However, the "warm" relationship between China and Japan had been revived by two Japanese Prime Ministers, Shinzo Abe and particularly Yasuo Fukuda whose father achieved to conclude the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China. In May 2008, Hu Jintao was the first General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in over a decade to be invited to Japan on an official visit, and called for increased "co-operation" between the two countries. A joint statement by General Secretary Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda announced a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, reading:[17][18]

"The two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" between Japan and China. They announced that they would align Japan–China relations with the trends of international community and together forge a bright future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world while deepening mutual understanding, building mutual trust, and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between their nations in an ongoing fashion into the future".

In October 2008, Japanese Prime Minister Tarō Asō visited Beijing to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China. At the reception, he remarked on his "personal conviction regarding Japan-China relations":[19]

"We should not constrain ourselves in the name of friendship between Japan and China. Rather, sound competition and active cooperation will constitute a true "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests." Confucius said, "At thirty, I stood firm." In the same way, Japan and China must now stand atop the international stage and work to spread to the rest of the world this spirit of benefiting together".

Although Japanese and Chinese policymakers claimed that "ice-breaking" and "ice-melting" occurred in the bilateral relationship between 2006 and 2010, however, none of the fundamental problems related to history and disputed territory had been resolved, and so there was a virtual "ice-berg" under the surface.[20][21]

Following 2009, the Democratic Party administrations under Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan pursued a "new foreign policy" that drew closer to China and integrated into Asia, leading to progress in the relationship. However, the Democratic Party's domestic and foreign policy blunders, particularly regarding the relocation of US military bases in Okinawa, brought this new foreign policy to an end. By the last Democratic Party administration under Yoshihiko Noda, Japan had renewed serious disagreements with China on historical issues and the Senkaku Islands.[22]

2010s

[edit]

In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy. In 2012, China's gross GDP was 1.4 times as big as Japan's. In 2011, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu criticized the annual Japanese defense white paper for its use of the China threat theory.[23]

In August 2012, Hong Kong activists landed on one of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu Islands), and Japanese nationalists responded by landing on the island the following week. In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the islets from a private Japanese owner, leading to widespread anti-Japan demonstrations in China.[24][25] As soon as Japanese government announced Japan's nationalization of the islands in 2012, relations between the two countries broke to a freezing point, which triggered a series of military action by Chinese government as countermeasures.[26] Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda purchased the islets on behalf of the central government to "pre-empt" Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara's plan to purchase them with Tokyo municipal funds. Ishihara is well known for his provocative nationalist actions, and Noda feared that Ishihara would try to occupy the islands or otherwise use them to provoke China."[26] Relations deteriorated further after the Japanese government purchase of the Senkaku islands, to the extent that China decided to skip IMF meetings held in Japan.[27] Mass protests against Japanese actions occurred in major Chinese cities. Trade relations deteriorated badly during the latter half of 2012[28] and Chinese government aircraft intruded into disputed airspace for the first time since 1958.[29] China has sent drones to fly near the islands. Japan has threatened to shoot these down, which China has said would be an act of war.[30]

In the early 2010s, bilateral cooperation between China and Japan largely stopped as political tensions ran high.[8]: 51 

After Shinzo Abe came back to power in 2012, he visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, worsening the relationship.[31] Abe strengthened the US-Japan alliance, cooperated with US President Barack Obama's Pivot to Asia policy, and adopted a strategy of containing and deterring China. In its 2013 white paper, Japan called recent Chinese actions "incompatible with international law."[32] The paper also mentioned Operation Dawn Blitz, after China had called for the exercise to be scaled back.[33] The Liberal Democratic Party that he led proposed constitutional revision, and changed the interpretation of the constitution in 2015 through the Legislation for Peace and Security.[34] American reporter Howard French states in 2017:[35]

to turn on the television in China is to be inundated with war-themed movies, which overwhelmingly focus on Japanese villainy. More than 200 anti-Japanese films were produced in 2012 alone, with one scholar calculating that 70% of Chinese TV dramas involved Japan-related war plots....A prominent Chinese foreign-policy thinker who has had extensive contact with the country's leadership told me, "in meetings since Xi has been in power [2012] you could feel the hatred. Everything is about punishing Japan. Punishing this damned [Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe." The most high-profile action that hurt the bilateral relations would be Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a place considered by most Chinese nationals as offensive because many WWII Japanese military criminals are worshipped there. China-Japan relations reached to the lowest point since the previous Prime Minister Koizumi's term because of his visit to the shrine. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo also visited Yasukuni Shrine many times after he got re-elected in 2010, which triggered furious anti-Japanese protests in China due to the negative attitudes and perceptions between the two nations. In a sense, both Koizumi and Abe made “maverick behavior”, in specific making visits to the Yasukuni Shrine as the proof to exhibit nationalism ideology, which endangered the China-Japan relations into the worst phase.

Relations between Japan and China improved in the wake of the China–United States trade war.[36][37] The improvement has been attributed to strong personal rapport between Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping, and to Japan's own trade disputes with the United States.[38][39] Abe advised Xi on trade negotiations with U.S. president Donald Trump.[40] In May 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan.[41] From 25 to 27 October 2018, at the invitation of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Shinzo Abe paid an official visit to China.[42]

2020s

[edit]

Sino-Japanese relations have experienced a thaw due to novel coronavirus outbreak. On 15 January 2020, Japan has confirmed the first case of novel coronavirus, first identified in Haneda Airport in Tokyo that emerge from Wuhan.[citation needed] With an ancient line of a poem by a Japanese emperor to a Chinese monk that inspired the latter to spread Buddhism to Japan: "Even though we live in different places, we live under the same sky" being tweeted out by government officials and with the stanza posted on the sides of boxes of face masks sent as aid to China. Japan's private sector has donated over 3 million face masks along with $6.3 million in monetary donation. China's Foreign Minister spokesperson Geng Shuang lauded Japan for their support.[43]

Amidst the spread of COVID-19 pandemic in Japan, China responded in kind by donating 12,500 COVID-19 test kits in aid to Japan after reports that the country was running low on test kits, with a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson saying in Japanese that "China and Japan are neighboring countries separated by only a narrow strip of water. Although there are no borders in fight against the spread of virus."[44] As of 4 June 2021, Japan also donated 1.24 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan.[45] This prompted a wave of gratitude from Taiwanese people,[46] whereas the Chinese foreign ministry condemned Japan's move.[47]

On 2 December 2021, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had summoned Japan's ambassador in Beijing, Hideo Tarumi, over remarks made by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on 1 December 2021 in support of Taiwan. In comments attributed to Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister. Hua Chunying, Beijing said Tokyo's envoy had been summoned over Abe's "irresponsible" remarks which presented a "brutal intervention" in China's internal affairs.[48] On 28 December 2021, both Japan and China agreed to set up a military hotline to defuse potential crises over disputed islands and the Taiwan Strait.[49]

On August 4, 2022, during U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, China conducted "precision missile strikes" in the ocean near Taiwan of which 5 missiles landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone.[50] Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi protested the missiles as "serious threats to Japan's national security and the safety of the Japanese people."[50] China announced a ban on Japanese seafood imports following the 2023 Fukushima wastewater release, which remains a point of contention.[51] In October 2023, Japan announced that it would expand anti-dumping duties on certain Chinese products, including exports via third countries, in an effort to counteract Chinese overproduction.[52]

In July 2024, Japanese media reported that a Japanese destroyer sailed into China's waters, despite Chinese vessels warning it.[53] Then on August 26, 2024, military aircraft from China briefly entered Japan's airspace, which had not happened before. According to the Ministry of Defense, the aircraft circled near the area around the Danjo Islands before entering local airspace for two minutes, then heading back to mainland China.[53] On July 11, 2025, Japan urged China to stop unsafe aerial maneuvers after a Chinese JH-7 fighter-bomber flew within 30 meters of a Japanese YS-11EB intelligence aircraft over the East China Sea. These incidents, which occurred outside Japanese airspace, were described by Japan's Defense Ministry as repeated and dangerous, citing the risk of collision.[54] In response, China accused Japan of closely surveilling routine Chinese military activities and demanded an end to such operations. Similar confrontations had taken place the previous month, including a near encounter over the Pacific during joint operations involving two Chinese aircraft carriers.[55]

2025 diplomatic crisis

[edit] Main article: 2025 China–Japan diplomatic crisis

In November 2025, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Chinese military actions against Taiwan, such as a naval blockade involving warships, could be seen as a "existential crisis situation" for Japan, triggering its security laws to mobilize forces under "collective self-defense."[56] In response, China's Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian posted on social media that "the dirty head that sticks itself in must be cut off" and although the message was later deleted after protest by the Japanese government, it led to a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan.[57][58] Beijing argued Takaichi's statements violated the 1972 Japan-China agreement on Taiwan while Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary reaffirmed Japan's commitment to the agreement and hoped for a peaceful resolution. Takaichi clarified her remarks were "hypothetical."[59] In addition to bipartisan calls in Japan for his expulsion, Xue's comment triggered criticism from the Taiwanese government and the U.S. ambassador to Japan[60][61] while China condemned Takaichi's remarks.[62] Japan and China issued mutual travel advisories and summoned the other country's ambassador.[63] China subsequently dispatched China Coast Guard vessels and military drones to patrol through the Senkaku Islands.[64] Additionally, the Chinese Commerce Ministry claimed that the trade cooperation between the two countries was "severely damaged" over Taiwan comments.[65]

Economic relations

[edit]

In 2005, China became Japan's biggest trading partner.[66]: 193  China is the largest recipient of Japanese exports.[67] In 2025, total trade between the two countries reached US$322.2 billion;[68] China is Japan's largest trading partner, while Japan is China's third largest trading partner.[69] Japan's economy is heavily reliant on China, especially on imports of consumer and industrial products.[70] As of 2024, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for 22.2% of the total exports values of Japan and 22.3% of imports of Japan.[71]

Development assistance

[edit]

Following the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, oil prices rose dramatically globally.[72]: 172  Among the industrialized countries, Japan was hit hardest by the resulting oil crisis because its petroleum needs were filled completely by imports.[72]: 172  It bought large amounts of Chinese oil.[72]: 172  China had also obtained commodity-backed loans from Japan to build the Daqing oil field, and repaid the loans with oil.[73]: 98 

At the end of 1978, the then prime minister Ohira said the government of Japan would offer Official Development Assistance to China.[74] ODA to China began in 1979 after the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China signed in 1978. From 1979 to 2013, Japan has provided US$24 billion in loan aid and 7.7 billion dollars in grant aid including 6.6 billion in technical cooperation, a total of US$32 billion. Even in 2013, Japan still provided US$296 million loan and US$30 million grant.[75][76]

The Japan Bank for International Cooperation provided China with resource loans for several coal and oil development projects over the period of 1979–1997.[8]: 62  These loans totaled $140 billion.[8]: 62  Assistance provided through Japan's 1992 Green Aid Plan helped facilitate China's development of renewable energy.[8]: 62 

While Official Development Aid programs were phased out in 2018, economic ties continued through trade and investment. In 2025, discussions have aimed at expanding economic collaboration, including resuming negotiations on a trilateral economic framework and strengthening cooperation under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.[77]

Foreign workers

[edit]

As of October 2023, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare had recorded roughly 397,900 Chinese workers inside the country, which made up its second highest percentage of foreign workers by country.[78] Many workers have ended up doing jobs considered to be Dirty, Dangerous and Demanding with restricted freedom of movement, subpar food provided, and little recourse in the event of disputes with their bosses.[79] Chinese employees at local construction companies in Kitakyushu disclosed in 2017 that along with gruelling work hours, they were given more unskilled or low-level tasks compared to that of their Japanese colleagues and were prohibited from speaking Chinese in their presence as part of the assimilationist workplace policies.[80]

Investment

[edit]

Compared with Japanese investment in China, Chinese investment in Japan is relatively small. According to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of China, China's direct investment flow to Japan in 2022 was US$396 million; as of the end of 2022, China's direct investment stock in Japan was US$5.075 billion.[81] China's main investment projects are in trade, finance and insurance, wholesale and retail, logistics, food industry, and aviation.[82]

Cultural relations

[edit]

Cultures of China and Japan have been profoundly influenced by each other throughout history.[83] China is the largest source of tourists to Japan; in the first nine months of 2025, nearly 7.5 million Chinese tourists visited Japan, accounting for around one-fifth of all tourists.[84] China is also the largest source of foreign students in Japan; there were 123,485 Chinese students in Japan in May 2024, accounting for 36.7 percent all foreign students in Japan.[85]

Figure skater Yuzuru Hanyu and retired table tennis player Ai Fukuhara are two of the most popular sportspeople in China,[86] with the former having received statements of support from Chinese diplomats during the 2022 Winter Olympics.[87] In the cinematic realm, actor Ken Takakura was a cultural icon in the country. Following his death in 2014, many Chinese locals paid tribute to him, including foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei who called him "a well-known Japanese artist to the Chinese people who made important and positive contributions to cultural exchanges between China and Japan".[88]

Bilateral issues

[edit]

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out some sensitive issues between China and Japan:[89]

1. Issue of history
2. Issue of Taiwan
3. Issue of Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)
4. Issue of Japanese-American security co-operation
5. Issue of war reparations
6. Japanese chemical weapons discarded in China

As Iechika[90] and many others point out, the fundamental concerns of the China-Japanese relations has been the issues of history and Taiwan. Therefore, this article describes the above two issues in the following.

Japanese war crimes

[edit] Main articles: Japanese history textbook controversies, Nanjing Massacre, Controversies surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, and Unit 731

Right-wing politicians in Japan have often denied Japan's war crimes during the Second Sino-Japanese War.[91] China joined other Asian countries, such as South Korea and North Korea, in criticizing Japanese history textbooks that downplay Japanese war crimes. They claimed that the rise of militarism became evident in Japanese politics. Much anti-Japanese sentiment has raised, and this has been exacerbated by burgeoning feelings of Chinese nationalism and former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.[92] Chinese political discourse describes the visits by Japanese political and public figures to the shrine, particularly when those visits occur on the anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, as "worshipping the devil".[93]: 126  Many Japanese believe that China is using the issue of the countries' checkered history, such as the Japanese history textbook controversies, and official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as both a diplomatic card and a tool to make Japan a scapegoat in domestic Chinese politics.[94]

Ex-Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama offered personal apology for Japan's wartime crimes, especially the Nanjing Massacre, "As a Japanese citizen, I feel that it's my duty to apologise for even just one Chinese civilian killed brutally by Japanese soldiers and that such action cannot be excused by saying that it occurred during war."[95] In a 2015 meeting, Xi stated to Abe that the "historical issue" is grave and that it was important for the Japanese government to send out "positive messages" about it.[91]

From late 19th century to early 20th century, one of the many factors contributing to the bankruptcy of the Qing government was Japan's requirement for large amount of war reparations. China paid huge amounts of silver to Japan under various treaties, including the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty (1871), Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), the Triple Intervention (1895) and the Boxer Protocol (1901). After the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95, the Qing government paid a total of 200,000,000 taels of silver to Japan for reparations.[96] The Second Sino-Japanese War 1936-1945 also caused huge economic losses to China. However, Chiang Kai-shek waived reparations claims for the war when the ROC concluded the Treaty of Taipei with Japan in 1952. Similarly, when Japan normalized its relations with China in 1972, Mao Zedong waived the claim of war reparations from Japan.[97] During the 1970s and 1980s, China rejected offers of economic compensation for the damage done by Japan during World War II.[98]: 226  China rejected these offers, viewing the acceptance of economic compensation as substituting for official apologies.[98]: 226–227  In particular, China desires an official apology from the Emperor of Japan.[98]: 226 

Okinawa

[edit] Further information: Ryukyu independence movement and Preparatory Committee for the Ryukyu Special Autonomous Region of China

In July 2012, Chinese Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times suggested that Beijing would consider challenging Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.[99] In May 2013, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, People's Daily, published another similar article by two Chinese scholars from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences which stated that "Chinese people shall support Ryukyu's independence",[100] soon followed by Luo Yuan's comment that "The Ryukyus belong to China, never to Japan".[101] It sparked a protest among the Japanese politicians, like Yoshihide Suga who said that Okinawa Prefecture "is unquestionably Japan's territory, historically and internationally".[100][102]

In December 2016, Japan's Public Security Intelligence Agency claimed that the Chinese government is "forming ties with the Okinawan independence movement through academic exchanges, with the intent of sparking a split within Japan".[103] In August 2020, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that China has funded of Okinawan newspapers to promote independence.[104] In October 2021, the French Institute for Strategic Studies (IRSEM) reported that China has supported the Okinawa independence movement in an attempt to weaken Japan.[105]

Key leaders of the Okinawa independence movement are reported to be supported by CCP united front influence operations.[106][107] Japanese media reported that an attempt to establish a Chinese police overseas service station was rebuffed.[108] On October 3, 2024, Nikkei Asia, in collaboration with a cyber security company, confirmed that there has been an increase in Chinese-language disinformation on social media promoting Ryukyuan independence, which are being spread by some suspected influence accounts. It is believed that the goal is to divide Japanese and international public opinion.[109] In November 2025, the Global Times published an editorial questioning Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.[110]

Taiwan

[edit] Main article: Political status of Taiwan

The Japan–Taiwan official split is one of the fundamental principles of China-Japan relations. China emphasizes Taiwan is a part of China and China is the only legal government of China (cf. One-China policy). By the 1972 agreement, the Treaty of Taipei was argued to be invalid.[citation needed] Japan has recognized the People's Republic of China "as the sole legal Government of China" since 1975 but has maintained an ambiguous stance regarding the PRC's sovereignty claim over the island of Taiwan, saying that it "fully understands and respects" China's position.[111]

When the China–Japan normalization was concerned, China had been worried about some Japanese pro-Taiwan independence politicians. At the same time, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan has been a big problem for China. In a point of China's view, the military alliance treaty implicitly directs to the Taiwan Strait. It has become a big factor for Taiwan security affairs.[citation needed]

Human rights

[edit] Further information: Human rights in China

In July 2019, the UN ambassadors from 22 nations, including Japan, signed a joint letter to the UNHRC condemning China's persecution of the Uyghurs as well as of other minority groups, urging the Chinese government to close the Xinjiang internment camps.[112][113] On 6 October 2020, a group of 39 countries, including Japan, the U.S., most of the EU member states, Albania, Canada, Haiti, Honduras, Australia and New Zealand, made a statement to denounce China for its treatment of ethnic minorities and for curtailing freedoms in Hong Kong.[114]

In October 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that Uyghurs, Tibetans, Inner Mongolians, and Chinese dissidents living in Japan face transnational repression by the Chinese government.[115][116]

Espionage

[edit] This section is an excerpt from Chinese intelligence activity abroad § Japan.[edit]

In 1976, Wang Yangran, a trader residing in Hong Kong, was arrested by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of violating the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. Wang used Hong Kong as a base to collect information on advanced Japanese technology using connections with Chinese authorities. This incident revealed the reality that Hong Kong, then under British rule, functioned as a detour route (Hong Kong route) for goods and information to mainland China.[117]

In 2004, a clerk at the Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai committed suicide. The clerk had been subjected to a honey trap and blackmail by Chinese public security authorities, who coerced him to provide diplomatic classified information. The clerk took his own life leaving a suicide note, preventing the leakage of information, but the incident exposed the reality of China's forceful recruitment operations targeting diplomats.[118][119]

In 2006, Yamaha Motor Company was raided for violating the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act for attempting to illegally export industrial unmanned helicopters capable of military diversion to China. The export destinations included companies deeply connected to the People's Liberation Army.[120]

In March 2007, Yang Luchuan, a Chinese engineer at major automotive parts manufacturer Denso, stole a large amount of drawings for automotive products by downloading and taking them out without permission[121]. Among these, about 280 types were related to state-of-the-art technology considered Denso's top secret; this Chinese engineer had returned to China multiple times during the period he was obtaining the company's data.[121]

According to a report by Trend Micro, the "Luckycat" hacker group is engaged in cyber-espionage on targets in Japan, India and Tibet. During the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, the hackers inserted a Trojan virus into PDF attachments to emails being circulated containing information about radiation dosage measurements.[122][123] Investigation into ownership of the command and control servers by Trend Micro and The New York Times linked the malware to Gu Kaiyuan, through QQ numbers and the alias "scuhkr".[124][125] Gu was a graduate student of the Information Security Institute of Sichuan University in Chengdu and wrote his master's thesis on computer hacking.[126] James A. Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes the attacks were state-sponsored.[124] Starting in 2019, Chinese state hacking group, MirrorFace, commenced cyberattacks against Japanese governmental institutions, according to the country's National Police Agency.[127]

Since 2010, cyberattacks against the Japanese manufacturing industry have intensified. There were a total of 42 cases since 2010, in which intellectual property such as manufacturing blueprints was stolen.[128]

In January 2011, a French executive at Renault took out technical confidential information regarding electric vehicles developed by Nissan Motor Corporation. The French newspaper Le Figaro reported on January 7, citing multiple sources, that "the final recipient of the leaked information is China"[129].

In 2012, Li Chunguang, a First Secretary at the Chinese Embassy in Japan, was charged with opening a bank account under a false identity. Li was alleged to be an officer of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army and was suspected of collecting classified information in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors and engaging in political maneuvering. Li refused police requests to appear for questioning and returned to China using diplomatic immunity.[130]

In 2014, a former employee of Nissan Motor Corporation illegally took out a large amount of technical data including trade secrets. He was arrested for violating the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, highlighting the seriousness of technology leakage in the automotive sector, Japan's leading industry.[131]

From September 2016 to April 2017, a large-scale cyberattack occurred by the hacker group "Tick" related to the People's Liberation Army. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department referred a male system engineer, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, to prosecutors for signing a contract for the rental server used in the attack under a false name.[132]

In 2017, an overseas police station under the Public Security Bureau of Nantong, Jiangsu Province, was established without Japan's consent. Commemorative photos taken at the time of establishment show the Nantong Municipal Party Committee Secretary and a counselor from the Chinese Embassy, suggesting it was established with official embassy recognition.[133]

In a cyberattack on Mitsubishi Electric discovered in 2020, the involvement of Chinese hacker groups "Tick" and "BlackTech" was suspected, and defense-related information was leaked[134]. In addition, activities by the Chinese state hacking group MirrorFace have been confirmed.[135]

According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, the group is believed to have started cyberattacks against Japanese government agencies in 2019.[136]

In 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' system for exchanging official telegrams containing diplomatic secrets was subjected to a Chinese cyberattack, resulting in a large-scale information leak[137]. U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) Director Paul Nakasone and others visited Japan to meet with high-ranking Japanese government officials, and working-level officials from Japan and the U.S. discussed the response.[138]

Regarding the persistent attacks on the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) from 2023 to 2024, the National Police Agency and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) identified them as being committed by MirrorFace and issued an unprecedented public attribution.[139]

In 2023, Quan Hengdao, a Chinese national and senior researcher at the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), was arrested for leaking fluorine compound synthesis technology to a Chinese company.[140] Quan participated in China's "Thousand Talents Plan" and was in a state of "dual affiliation," concurrently serving as a professor at Beijing Institute of Technology.[citation needed]

In 2024, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department conducted a search of a building in Akihabara believed to be a Chinese public security overseas base.[141]

East China Sea

[edit] Main article: Senkaku Islands dispute

Both China and Japan claim sovereignty over East China Sea islets that Japan calls the Senkaku Islands and China calls the Diaoyu Islands.[142][143]

In August 1990, tensions over the islands between Japan, China, and the ROC rose after Japanese media reported that the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency was preparing to recognize (as an official navigation mark) a lighthouse that a right-wing Japanese group built on the main island of the disputed island group.[144]: 258  PRC Vice Foreign Minister Qi Huaiyuan met with the Japanese Ambassador, reiterated China's position of sovereignty over the islands, and stating that the two countries should shelve the dispute and look for opportunities to jointly develop resources in the area.[144]: 259  On 30 October 1990, China and Japan stopped disputing the lighthouse issue.[144]: 259  In 2005, clashes between Taiwanese (Chinese) protesters and the Japanese government in April 2005 led to anti-Japanese protests and sporadic violence across China, from Beijing to Shanghai, later Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shenyang.[145]

In 2025, the East China Sea remains a flashpoint due to territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, claimed by both nations. The dispute has led to frequent naval confrontations, with China's growing military presence raising concerns in Tokyo. Despite tensions, Japan and China continue diplomatic efforts to manage their differences while maintaining economic cooperation.[77] In June 2025, Japan protested China's construction of new structures in the East China Sea.[146]

2010 Trawler collision

[edit] Main article: 2010 Senkaku boat collision incident

From 2005 to the 2010 incident, bilateral relations between China and Japan had been trending positively.[144]: 264  On 7 September 2010, after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the disputed islands, the captain of the trawler was arrested by Japanese sailors, resulting in tensions between the two countries.[147] The rest of the Chinese crew was also arrested.[144]: 264  In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, the Chinese government sought to restrain hardline Chinese public sentiment.[144]: 264  The Chinese government ordered the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands to withdraw their open letter of protest to the Japanese government.[144]: 264  It also stopped a boat trip to the disputed islands from departing Xiamen on 10 September and dispersed anti-Japanese protests in Beijing, Nanjing, Changsha.[144]: 264  It instructed PLA media commentators not to talk about the incident, censored key words related to the dispute online, and shut down internet chat rooms.[144]: 264–265 

On 19 September, the Japanese government extended its detention of the boat captain on the basis of domestic Japanese law.[144]: 264  This detention differed from the Japanese Coast Guard's usual approach of expelling or deporting those that it viewed as intruders in the area.[144]: 265  Japan also announced that the disputed islands were covered by the United States-Japan Security Alliance.[144]: 265  The Chinese government viewed these actions as a change to the status quo treatment of the disputed islands and as an assertion of Japanese de jure sovereignty over them.[144]: 265  In response, China detained four Japanese nationals for entering a restricted military area in China and also suspended high-level security exchanges with Japan.[144]: 265  Shortly thereafter, China placed informal limits on Japanese tourism and the export of rare earth metals to Japan (whether the restrictions on rare earth exports were a response to the incident remains a matter of debate as of at least 2024).[144]: 265  Japan subsequently released the captain.[144]: 265 

2014 Baosteel Emotion seizure

[edit]

In April 2014, China seized a cargo ship, the Baosteel Emotion, over unpaid compensation for two Chinese ships leased in 1936. According to China, the ships were used by the Japanese Army and later sunk. A Chinese court ruled in 2007 that Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, owner of the Baosteel Emotion, had to pay 190 million yuan (approx. US$30.5 million) as compensation for the two ships. Mitsui appealed against the decision, but it was upheld in 2012. The Baosteel Emotion was released after three days, when Mitsui paid approximately US$28 million in compensation. Japan has stated that the seizure undermines the Japan–China Joint Communiqué. The seizure came at a point when tensions over the Senkaku Islands were running high.[148][149][150]

Public perceptions

[edit] Main articles: Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan, Anti-Japanese sentiment in China, and Anti–People's Republic of China sentiment § Japan

Due to historical grievances and present geopolitical disagreements, relations between the Japanese and Chinese people are generally one of mutual hostility. According to a 2014 BBC World Service Poll, 3% of Japanese people view China's influence positively, with 73% expressing a negative view, the most negative perception of China in the world, while 5% of Chinese people view Japanese influence positively, with 90% expressing a negative view, the most negative perception of Japan in the world.[151] A 2014 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 85% of Japanese were concerned that territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to a military conflict.[152]

Online hate speech against the Japanese is common on Chinese social media.[153] Chinese animosity or even hatred of Japan is reflected in the popular culture. A 2019 survey published by the Pew Research Center found that 85% of Japanese people had an unfavorable view of China, while 75% of Chinese people had an unfavorable view of Japan.[154][155] According to a Genron NPO poll in 2024, 89% of Japanese people have a negative view of China, while 87.7% of Chinese people have a negative opinion of Japan.[156] A survey published in 2025 by the Pew Research Center found that 86% of Japanese people had an unfavorable view of China, while 13% had a favorable view, the most negative of any nation surveyed.[157]

The Economist has written that according to a survey done in 2021, more than 40% of Japanese aged 18–29 feel an "affinity" towards China, compared to only 13% for those aged in their 60s and 70s.[158]

Diplomatic visits

[edit] From Japan to China

Year	Name
1972	Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
1979	Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira
1982	Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
1984	Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
1986	Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
1988	Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita
1991	Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
1992	The Emperor and Empress
1994	Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa
1995	Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
1997	Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
1999	Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi
2001	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (APEC in Shanghai)
2006	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
2007	Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda
2008	Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (Summer Olympics in Beijing) Prime Minister Taro Aso (ASEM in Beijing)
2009	Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Beijing)
2011	Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
2012	Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Beijing)
2014	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (APEC in Beijing)
2016	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (G20 summit in Hangzhou)
2018	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
2019	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Chengdu)

From China to Japan

Year	Name
1978	Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
1979	Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
1980	CCP Chairman and Premier Hua Guofeng (state guest)
1982	Premier Zhao Ziyang
1983	CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang
1989	Premier Li Peng
1992	CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin
1995	CCP General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin (APEC in Osaka)
1997	Premier Li Peng
1998	CCP General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin (state guest)
2000	Premier Zhu Rongji
2007	Premier Wen Jiabao
2008	CCP General Secretary and President Hu Jintao (state guest)General Secretary and President Hu Jintao (G8 summit in Hokkaido)Premier Wen Jiabao (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Fukuoka)
2010	CCP General Secretary and President Hu Jintao (APEC in Yokohama)
2011	Premier Wen Jiabao (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Fukushima and Tokyo)
2018	Premier Li Keqiang (China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Tokyo)
2019	CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping (G20 summit in Osaka)

See also

[edit]

• Kwantung Leased Territory
• Chinese people in Japan
• Japanese people in China

References

[edit]

1. ^ Cartwright, Mark (27 June 2017). "Ancient Japanese & Chinese Relations". World History Encyclopedia. Retrieved 22 March 2022.
2. ^ Šebok, Filip (2023). "Historical Legacy". In Kironska, Kristina; Turscanyi, Richard Q. (eds.). Contemporary China: a New Superpower?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-03-239508-1.
3. ^ a b c d e f g h Zhao, Suisheng (2022). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign policy. Stanford University Press. p. 48. doi:10.1515/9781503634152. ISBN 978-1-5036-3415-2.
4. ^ "Chronology 1973". The World Book Year Book 1974. Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corporation. 1974. p. 8. ISBN 0-7166-0474-4. LCCN 62-4818.
5. ^ (Article 2) “The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” MOFA: Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China
6. ^ Crean, Jeffrey (2024). The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History. New Approaches to International History series. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-23394-2.
7. ^ Hagström, Linus (2005) Japan's China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis, London and New York: Routledge http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415346795/.
8. ^ a b c d e f g Lewis, Joanna I. (2023). Cooperating for the Climate: Learning from International Partnerships in China's Clean Energy Sector. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-54482-5.
9. ^ a b Klien, S. Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective. Routledge, 2002. p. 89. ISBN 978-0-415-93438-1.
10. ^ a b China rips US for halting arms flow, aiding dissident, Chicago Sun-Times, 8 June 1989.
11. ^ a b c "中国共产党新闻网中日双边关系". Archived from the original on 2007-09-11. Retrieved 2009-06-11.
12. ^ a b "MOFA: Japan-China Joint Declaration On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development". www.mofa.go.jp. Retrieved 2018-01-20.
13. ^ "Japan's Akihito Ends Historic and Cordial Visit to China". Los Angeles Times. 1992-10-29. Retrieved 2025-11-19.
14. ^ "China hails ex-Japanese PM Murayama who stated 'deep remorse' over WWII". South China Morning Post. 2025-10-17. Retrieved 2025-11-19.
15. ^ "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee". MOFA. 2005-02-19. Retrieved 2010-10-04.
16. ^ an argument China uses often to support their nationalistic aims
17. ^ Kawashima, Shin (29 February 2024). "China and Japan: What's in a Term?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 2025-11-29.
18. ^ "Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests" (May 7, 2008)". MOFA. Retrieved 2010-10-04.
19. ^ "Remarks by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Reception to Commemorate the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China "My Personal Conviction regarding Japan-China Relations" (October 24, 2008)". MOFA. Retrieved 2010-10-04.
20. ^ Hagström, Linus (2008/09) "Sino-Japanese Relations: The Ice That Won't Melt," International Journal 64 (1): 223–40, http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/intj64&div=22&id=&page
21. ^ "Backlash over the alleged China curb on metal exports". The Daily Telegraph, London, 29 Aug 2010. Retrieved 30 August 2010.
22. ^ "Japan abandons bid to make China a key pillar of its foreign policy". Christian Science Monitor. ISSN 0882-7729. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
23. ^ "China says Japan defence paper 'irresponsible'." AFP, 4 August 2011.[dead link]
24. ^ "Anti-Japan Protests sweep throughout China, after Japanese Nationalists Land on Disputed Island". Eastern Odyssey. 19 August 2012. Retrieved 16 September 2012.
25. ^ "China Sends More Ships, as Disputed Island Row Grows". Eastern Odyssey. 14 September 2012. Retrieved 16 September 2012.
26. ^ a b Nye, Joseph (March–April 2013). "Our Pacific Predicament". The American Interest. VIII (4). Archived from the original on 15 March 2013. Retrieved 13 March 2013.
27. ^ "China banks pull out of meetings in Japan." Al Jazeera, 3 October 2012.
28. ^ "Japan Exports Tumble 10% as Maehara Presses BOJ to Ease: Economy". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 2012-10-22. Retrieved 2026-02-02.
29. ^ "Japan protests Chinese plane entering their airspace."
30. ^ Sevastopulo, Demetri; Soble, Soble (October 28, 2013). "China-Japan relations take turn for worse". Financial Times. The Financial Times Ltd. Retrieved 2 November 2013.
31. ^ "日本首相安倍晋三要参拜靖国神社". 2013-12-26. Archived from the original on 2014-01-07. Retrieved 2014-02-14.
32. ^ "Japan's Blunt Stance Riles China, S. Korea."
33. ^ "Dawn Blitz grabs China's attention". Archived from the original on 2013-06-13. Retrieved 2013-07-14.
34. ^ "「憲法改正草案」を発表". Archived from the original on 2013-12-14. Retrieved 2013-12-10.
35. ^ Howard W. French (2017). Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power. Knopf Doubleday. p. 21. ISBN 9780385353335.
36. ^ Landers, Peter (12 September 2018). "Japan and China Find Common Ground in Trump's Tariffs as Leaders Meet". Wall Street Journal.
37. ^ "Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping 'pledge Japan and China will deepen ties'". South China Morning Post.
38. ^ "Japan and China forge new friendship during rare visit". SBS. 27 October 2018.
39. ^ "Japan and China try new approach to friendship, 40 years on". The Nikkei. 23 October 2018.
40. ^ "Shinzo Abe's advice to Xi Jinping on talking tariffs with Donald Trump at their G20 trade war dinner". South China Morning Post. 6 December 2018.
41. ^ "共同社：李克強下月訪日行程大致敲定". 香港電台. 2018-04-08. Archived from the original on 2019-06-24. Retrieved 2020-01-20.
42. ^ "日本首相安倍晋三将访华". Archived from the original on 2018-10-16. Retrieved 2018-10-16.
43. ^ Emiko Jozuka; Serenitie Wang (26 February 2020). "China and Japan's budding relationship is thawing in the time of coronavirus". CNN. Retrieved 2020-02-26.
44. ^ "Chinese gov't gives Japan 12,500 coronavirus test kits for free". Mainichi Daily News. 2020-02-26. Retrieved 2020-02-26.
45. ^ "Taiwan's COVID-19 vaccine stocks more than doubled by Japan donation". Reuters. 2021-06-04. Retrieved 2021-07-03.
46. ^ "'Thank you, Japan Airlines': Taiwan air traffic controller commends flight for bringing in vaccines". Apple Daily. Archived from the original on 2021-06-06.
47. ^ "China condemns Japan offering vaccine to Taiwan". NHK WORLD. Archived from the original on 2021-05-31.
48. ^ "China summons Japan's ambassador over Taiwan comments | DW | 02.12.2021". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
49. ^ Lewis, Leo; Hille, Kathrin; Mitchell, Tom (2021-12-28). "Japan and China agree to launch military hotline". Financial Times. Retrieved 2021-12-28.
50. ^ a b "China's missle [sic] landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone". Asahi. August 5, 2022. Archived from the original on August 12, 2022.
51. ^ "Hegseth to fly to the Philippines and Japan in first visit to Asian treaty allies at odds with China". AP News. 2025-03-21. Retrieved 2025-03-25.
52. ^ Furubayashi, Yuka (October 6, 2025). "Japan to expand antidumping tariffs amid continued China overproduction". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 2025-10-07.
53. ^ a b Gale, Alastair (August 26, 2024). "Chinese Military Plane Enters Japan Airspace for First Time". Bloomberg News. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
54. ^ "Japan asks China not to fly jets too close to Japanese military aircraft". Business Standard. July 11, 2025.
55. ^ "Beijing says Japan at fault for warplane nearing Japanese aircraft". NHK World Japan. July 13, 2025. Archived from the original on July 15, 2025.
56. ^ "'Taiwan contingency' could prompt Japanese armed reaction: Japan PM - Focus Taiwan". Focus Taiwan - CNA English News. 2025-11-07. Retrieved 2025-11-11.
57. ^ "Japan protests 'inappropriate' post by Chinese consul-general on Takaichi remark". NHK World. 2025-11-10. Retrieved 2025-11-10.
58. ^ "China Escalates Japan Spat With Threats of Economic Reprisal". Bloomberg News. 17 November 2025. Retrieved 17 November 2025.
59. ^ "Explainer: Why did Japan PM's Taiwan remarks cause such a stir?". Reuters. 2025-11-11.
60. ^ Chen, Laurie; Geddie, John (November 2025). "Japan rebukes Chinese diplomat as Taiwan furore escalates". Reuters. Retrieved 18 November 2025.
61. ^ Geddie, John; Lee, Liz (November 2025). "'Crossed the line': Chinese state media blast Japan PM as Taiwan spat rumbles on". Reuters. Retrieved 18 November 2025.
62. ^ "China and Japan in escalating spat over Taiwan: What to know". www.bbc.com. 2025-11-15. Retrieved 2025-11-15.
63. ^ Geddie, John; Lee, Liz (November 2025). "Japan warns citizens in China about safety as diplomatic crisis deepens". Reuters. Retrieved 18 November 2025.
64. ^ Davidson, Helen; McCurry, Justin (2025-11-16). "China sends coast guard to Senkaku islands amid row with Japan". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
65. ^ Cash, Joe; Kelly, Tim (2025-11-20). "China says trade cooperation with Japan 'severely damaged' by Taiwan comments". Reuters.
66. ^ Li, Xiaobing (2018). The Cold War in East Asia. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-65179-1.
67. ^ Sacks, David. Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict. Council on Foreign Relations, 2022. JSTOR website Retrieved 20 June 2025.
68. ^ "2025年12月进出口商品主要国别（地区）总值表（美元值）" [Table of total value of import and export commodities by major countries (regions) in December 2025 (US dollars)]. General Administration of Customs. 14 January 2026. Retrieved 14 January 2026.
69. ^ "China's Economy Overview" (PDF). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 26 October 2025.
70. ^ "Japan relies on China, other single import partners for 40% of goods". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 2025-10-26.
71. ^ "Japan exports hit record high, but trade deficit continues". Asashi Shimbun. Associated Press. 23 January 2025.
72. ^ a b c Hou, Li (2021). Building for Oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State. Harvard-Yenching Institute monograph series. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 978-0-674-26022-1.
73. ^ Chen, Muyang (2024). The Latecomer's Rise: Policy Banks and the Globalization of China's Development Finance. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9781501775857.
74. ^ Masuda, Masayuki (2003). "Japan's Changing ODA Policy Towards China". China Perspectives. 2003 (3). doi:10.4000/chinaperspectives.358.
75. ^ "Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
76. ^ "ODA achievement retrieval". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Archived from the original on 2017-06-02. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
77. ^ a b "Japan's leader calls for finding common ground ahead of key meeting with China and South Korea". AP News. 2025-03-21. Retrieved 2025-03-25.
78. ^ VnExpress. "Vietnamese make up largest percentage of Japan's foreign workforce". VnExpress International.
79. ^ Michelle Chen (23 June 2011). "Chinese in Japan Caught in Tide of Exploited Labor". In These Times.
80. ^ McCornac, Dennis C; Zhang, Rong (27 August 2017). "Assimilating into the Japanese Labour Market - Challenges Faced by Chinese Migrant Construction Industry Workers". Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies. 17 (2). Nishinippon Institute of Technology.
81. ^ "《2022年度中国对外直接投资统计公报》" (PDF). 中国商务部、国家统计局和国家外汇管理局.
82. ^ "对外投资合作国别（地区）指南" [Country (Region) Guide to Outward Investment and Cooperation - Japan - 2024 Edition] (PDF). www.mofcom.gov.cn (in Chinese). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2025-11-14.
83. ^ "China's Influence in East Asia: Present and Future". Brookings. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
84. ^ Murakami, Sakura; Yokoyama, Erica (17 November 2025). "Japan Calls China's Travel Warning Unacceptable as Spat Simmers". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 21 November 2025.
85. ^ "Foreign Students in Japan Hit New Record in 2024". nippon.com. 2025-06-09. Retrieved 2025-11-21.
86. ^ Phoebe Zhang (11 July 2021). "China celebrates 'favourite Japanese' table tennis star and Olympian Ai Fukuhara's 'divorce freedom'". SCMP. Retrieved 29 November 2025.
87. ^ Bloomberg News (9 February 2022). "China's Love of Japanese Skater Hanyu Transcends Politics". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022.
88. ^ AFP News (18 November 2014). "China mourns death of Japanese actor Takakura". Yahoo! News Singapore. Retrieved 29 November 2025.
89. ^ "Bilateral relations to Japan: Some sensitive issues". FMPRC. Retrieved 2010-10-04.
90. ^ Iechika (2003)
91. ^ a b Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2024). "What Did the CCP Learn from the Past?". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. p. 42. ISBN 9789087284411. JSTOR jj.15136086.
92. ^ A Shinto shrine that offers prayers for the war dead including 14 Class A war criminals
93. ^ Wang, Erika Ningxin; Huang, Qian (2026). Fandom Nationalism: Participatory Censorship and Performative Patriotism in East Asia. Bloomsbury Fandom Primers Series. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 979-8-7651-2516-8.
94. ^ "Why China Loves to Hate Japan". Time. 2005-12-10. Archived from the original on 2005-12-14.
95. ^ "Former Japanese PM Yukio Hatoyama apologises for atrocities in China". South China Morning Post. 2013-11-13. Archived from the original on 2023-04-09.
96. ^ Zhiguo Kong (2016). The Making of a Maritime Power: China's Challenges and Policy Responses. Springer. p. 5. ISBN 9789811017865.
97. ^ See the Article 5 of Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1972.
98. ^ a b c Li, David Daokui (2024). China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0393292398.
99. ^ Kathrin Hille; Mure Dickie (23 July 2012). "Japan's claim to Okinawa disputed by influential Chinese commentators". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 16 October 2021. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
100. ^ a b Julian Ryall (10 May 2013). "Japan angered by China's claim to all of Okinawa". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 1 December 2022. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
101. ^ Miles Yu (16 May 2013). "Inside China: China vs. Japan and U.S. on Okinawa". The Washington Times. Archived from the original on 13 February 2017. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
102. ^ Martin Fackler (5 July 2013). "In Okinawa, Talk of Break From Japan Turns Serious". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
103. ^ Isabel Reynolds (26 December 2016). "Japan Sees Chinese Groups Backing Okinawa Independence Activists". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 29 May 2017. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
104. ^ Stewart, Devin (23 July 2020). "China's Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular CSIS". Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 6 May 2023.
105. ^ "OPÉRATIONS D'INFLUENCE CHINOISES". Archived from the original on 2 October 2021. Retrieved 1 May 2023.
106. ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (December 20, 2023). "China is winning online allies in Okinawa's independence movement". Axios. Retrieved December 20, 2023.
107. ^ Hsiao, Russell (June 26, 2019). "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 2024-10-14.
108. ^ Ryall, Julian (2025-01-25). "China infiltrating Japan in preparation for Taiwan invasion". The Daily Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Retrieved 2025-01-25.
109. ^ Kanematsu, Yuichiro (October 3, 2024). "Social media fuel pro-Okinawa independence disinformation blitz". Nikkei Asia. Archived from the original on 3 October 2024. Retrieved 2024-10-03.
110. ^ "Japan says comment on Chinese paper's Okinawa sovereignty claims unnecessary". Japan Today. 2025-12-02. Retrieved 2025-12-04.
111. ^ Liff, Adam P. (23 August 2021). "Has Japan's policy toward the Taiwan Strait changed?". Brookings. The Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on 16 April 2022. Retrieved 16 April 2022.
112. ^ "Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?". The Diplomat. 15 July 2019.
113. ^ "More than 20 ambassadors condemn China's treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang". The Guardian. Agence France-Presse. 2019-07-11. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2024-10-12.
114. ^ "Japan among 39 nations calling on China to respect Uighur human rights". The Japan Times. Archived from the original on 7 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020.
115. ^ Sharma, Shweta (2024-10-10). "Chinese political repression no longer limited to China, HRW warns". The Independent. Retrieved 2024-10-12.
116. ^ "China harassing its citizens in Japan it considers subversive: report". Mainichi Daily News. 2024-10-10. Retrieved 2024-10-12.
117. ^ "昭和52年 警察白書 第7章 公安の維持". 警察庁. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
118. ^ "上海で｢かぐや姫｣に溺れた海自1等海曹の末路". PRESIDENT ONLINE (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-13.
119. ^ 小泉, 純一郎 (2006-02-24). "衆議院議員鈴木宗男君提出在上海総領事館員自殺事件に関する第三回質問に対する答弁書". The House of Representatives, Japan. Retrieved 2026-01-13.
120. ^ "第1回 無人ヘリ事件が示唆するもの". ITmedia エンタープライズ (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-09.
121. ^ a b "「デンソーの最高機密」はこうして中国人の手に渡った…パソコン破壊の痛恨事態はなぜ起きた？". ダイヤモンド・オンライン (in Japanese). 2024-09-11. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
122. ^ "Luckycat Redux: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan" (PDF). MalwareLab. 2012. p. 6.[permanent dead link]
123. ^ Gonsalves, Antone (30 March 2012). "Hackers Linked To Cyber-Espionage in Japan, India, Tibet". CRN Magazine. Archived from the original on 27 June 2012. Retrieved 21 August 2012.
124. ^ a b Perlroth, Nicole (29 March 2012). "Case Based in China Puts a Face on Persistent Hacking". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 14 November 2013. Retrieved 21 August 2012.
125. ^ Hopkins, Curt (30 March 2012). "Reports identify Chinese grad student in hacks against Tibetans, others". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 4 July 2012. Retrieved 21 August 2012.
126. ^ Brown, Mark (30 March 2012). "Global cyberattacks linked to Chinese LuckyCat hacker group". Wired. Archived from the original on 9 July 2012. Retrieved 21 August 2012.
127. ^ Yamaguchi, Mari (2025-01-08). "Japan links Chinese hacker MirrorFace to dozens of cyberattacks targeting security and tech data". Associated Press. Retrieved 2025-01-08.
128. ^ Corera, Gordon; Scott, Jennifer (13 January 2022). "MI5 warning over 'Chinese agent' in Parliament". BBC. Archived from the original on 17 December 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
129. ^ "機密情報漏洩 日産への影響懸念 EV技術、中国流出か" [Confidential information leak raises concerns about impact on Nissan, EV technology leaked to China]. 日本経済新聞 (in Japanese). 2011-01-08. Archived from the original on 2023-03-12. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
130. ^ 臺, 宏士 (2012-05-31). "中国書記官を書類送検 外国人登録法違反の疑いで警視庁". 日本経済新聞 (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-13.
131. ^ Shimbun, Nikkei (2014-06-11). "日産元社員を処分保留で釈放 横浜地検". 日本経済新聞 (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-13.
132. ^ "JAXA攻撃「背景に中国軍」 警察庁長官が初めて言及：朝日新聞". 朝日新聞 (in Japanese). 2021-04-22. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
133. ^ 「文藝春秋」編集部 (2023-06-08). "(2ページ目)中国「秘密警察」日本での設立と活動の証拠写真を入手". 文春オンライン (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-09.
134. ^ "三菱電機、不正アクセス事件の詳細を公開、攻撃者は「ファイルレスマルウェア」で中国拠点から感染を拡大". INTERNET Watch. 14 February 2020. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
135. ^ 内閣サイバーセキュリティーセンター, 警視庁 (2025-01-08). "MirrorFace によるサイバー攻撃について （注意喚起）" (PDF). 警視庁内閣サイバーセキュリティーセンター. Retrieved 2026-01-13.
136. ^ Yamaguchi, Mari (2025-01-08). "Japan links Chinese hacker MirrorFace to dozens of cyberattacks targeting security and tech data". Associated Press. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
137. ^ "外務省のシステムに中国がサイバー攻撃、公電含む大規模な情報漏えい…主要な政府機関のシステム点検". 読売新聞オンライン (in Japanese). 2024-02-05. Retrieved 2026-01-09.
138. ^ 産経新聞 (2024-02-05). "外務省公電情報が漏洩 中国からサイバー攻撃 閉域システムに侵入". 産経新聞：産経ニュース (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-13.
139. ^ 産経新聞 (2024-02-05). "外務省公電情報が漏洩 中国からサイバー攻撃 閉域システムに侵入". 産経新聞：産経ニュース (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-13.
140. ^ Inc, Nikkei (2025-02-25). "産総研データ漏洩、中国籍元研究員に有罪判決 東京地裁". 日本経済新聞 (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-09. {{cite web}}: |last= has generic name (help)
141. ^ 産経新聞 (2024-03-22). "在外同胞を監視か、警視庁公安部が捜索した中国の「海外警察拠点」とは 「監視・警戒を」". 産経新聞：産経ニュース (in Japanese). Retrieved 2026-01-09.
142. ^ Jash, Amrita (22 February 2017). "Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute: identity versus territory". Policy Forum.
143. ^ Nanjing by the Numbers Archived 2014-10-24 at the Wayback Machine. Foreign Policy. 9 February 2010.
144. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Wang, Frances Yaping (2024). The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197757512.
145. ^ York, Geoffrey (April 11, 2005). "In China's streets, massive protests . . ". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved January 25, 2020.
146. ^ "Japan protests against new Chinese structure in East China Sea". Reuters. June 25, 2025. Retrieved June 28, 2025.
147. ^ "High-seas collisions trigger Japan-China spat". Tokyo. Agence France-Presse. 2010-09-07. Archived from the original on July 31, 2011. Retrieved 2010-10-21.
148. ^ "China seizes Japanese cargo ship over pre-war debt". www.bbc.com. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2014-04-21. Retrieved 2014-05-28.
149. ^ "Japan Warns China Over Ship Seizure". www.defensenews.com. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE. 2014-04-21. Archived from the original on 2014-04-21. Retrieved 2014-04-21.
150. ^ "Chinese court releases Japanese cargo ship". BBC News. 2014-04-24. Retrieved 2021-05-19.
151. ^ 2014 World Service Poll Archived 2015-03-05 at the Wayback Machine BBC
152. ^ "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other". Pew Research Center. 2014-07-14. Retrieved 10 October 2015.
153. ^ Yuan, Li (July 4, 2024). "Is Xenophobia on Chinese Social Media Teaching Real-World Hate?". The New York Times. Archived from the original on September 24, 2024. Retrieved September 26, 2024.
154. ^ "Public opinion on China turns negative in Western Europe and Asia-Pacific, survey finds". South China Morning Post. 2 October 2019.
155. ^ "People around the globe are divided in their opinions of China". Pew Research Center. 30 September 2019.
156. ^ "'Really unfortunate': political rows stoke deep mutual Japan-China distrust". South China Morning Post. 2024-12-04. Retrieved 2025-11-19.
157. ^ "International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive". Pew Research Center. 15 July 2025. Retrieved 16 July 2025.
158. ^ "Japanese youngsters want to look like Chinese starlets". The Economist. 19 January 2023. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2023-01-19.

External links

[edit] Library resources about China–Japan relations

• Resources in your library
• Resources in other libraries

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Relations of China and Japan.

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: Japan
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-China Relations

v t e China–Japan relations
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of China, Tokyo Ambassadors of China to Japan Embassy of Japan, Beijing Ambassadors of Japan to China
Diplomacy	Japanese missions to Imperial China Ryūkyū Disposition Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty Nishihara Loans Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement Twenty-One Demands Treaty of Taipei Sino-Japanese Journalist Exchange Agreement Japan–China Joint Communiqué Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China State visit by Jiang Zemin to Japan Japan–South Korea Joint Declaration of 1998 China–Japan–South Korea Free Trade Agreement China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
Conflicts	First Sino-Japanese War Treaty of Shimonoseki Second Sino-Japanese War Manchukuo North China Buffer State Strategy Anti-Comintern Pact ABCD line Greater East Asia Conference He–Umezu Agreement Chin–Doihara Agreement Japanese war crimes Nanjing Massacre Japanese Instrument of Surrender Japanese repatriation from Huludao Association of Returnees from China Controversies surrounding Yasukuni Shrine Boycotts of Japanese products Senkaku Islands Senkaku Islands dispute 2010 Senkaku boat collision incident Baodiao movement Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands Ryūkyū independence movement Exclusive economic zone of Japan
Incidents	Ningbo incident Jiajing wokou raids María Luz incident Imo Incident Gapsin Coup Convention of Tientsin Nagasaki incident Shandong Problem May Fourth Movement Racial Equality Proposal Lansing–Ishii Agreement Hankou incident Jinan incident Mao Zedong thanking Japan controversy Japanese history textbook controversies 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations Nobukatsu Fujioka 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations 2025–2026 China–Japan diplomatic crisis
Related	History of China–Japan relations Japan–Taiwan relations Chinese influence on Japanese culture Differences between Shinjitai and Simplified characters Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan Shina Anti-Japanese sentiment in China Guizi Jingri Xiao Riben China–Japan football rivalry 2004 AFC Asian Cup final China–Japan Friendship Hospital Bank of Taiwan Building Yokohama Specie Bank Building Japan-China Joint History Research Committee Japan–Ming trade-ship flag Emperor at home, king abroad TPE (cable system) Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China Pei Shiqing Kosei Fukunaga Yang Shoujing Satoru Mizushima Liu Lianren Zhapu Ling Ling Memoirs of a Geisha The Most Recent Biographies of Chinese Dignitaries New Life+: Young Again in Another World
Category:China–Japan relations

v t e Foreign relations of China
Bilateral relations Africa Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Djibouti Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Eswatini Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa South Sudan Sudan Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Americas Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago United States Uruguay Venezuela Asia Afghanistan Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Cambodia Georgia India Indonesia Iran Iraq Israel Japan history Jordan Kazakhstan Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Malaysia Maldives Mongolia Myanmar Nepal North Korea history Oman Pakistan Palestine Philippines Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore South Korea history Sri Lanka Syria Tajikistan Thailand Timor-Leste Turkey Turkmenistan United Arab Emirates Uzbekistan Vietnam Northern Domination Yemen Europe Albania Andorra Austria Belarus Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kosovo Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova Monaco Montenegro Netherlands North Macedonia Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom Vatican City Oceania Australia Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia Nauru New Zealand Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Relations within China Hong Kong Macau Taiwan Former states Soviet Union Yugoslavia
Multilateral relations BCIM Economic Corridor BIMSTEC Africa Arab League BRICS Caribbean China–Japan–South Korea European Union Latin America Oceania Third World United Nations Arctic policy of China China and the Antarctic
Diplomacy Central Foreign Affairs Commission (Office) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister) Diplomatic missions of China / in China Diplomatic partnerships Belt and Road Initiative China's core interests China's peaceful rise Chinese Century Chinese government sanctions Unreliable Entity List Confucius Institute Dates of diplomatic recognition Foreign policy of China Foreign Relations Law Foreign relations of Hong Kong Nine-dash line Panda diplomacy Political status of Taiwan Chinese unification One China principle Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Stadium diplomacy String of Pearls Major historical splits Soviet Albania Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Treaties Theater diplomacy Wolf warrior diplomacy Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy

v t e Foreign relations of Japan
Bilateral relations Africa Algeria Angola Botswana Djibouti Egypt Ethiopia Kenya Libya Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Somalia South Africa Americas Argentina Barbados Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Trinidad and Tobago United States Uruguay Venezuela Asia Afghanistan Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Cambodia China Georgia India Indonesia Iran Israel Kazakhstan Laos Malaysia Maldives Mongolia Myanmar Nepal North Korea Pakistan Palestine Philippines Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore South Korea Sri Lanka Syria Taiwan Thailand Timor-Leste Turkey Vietnam Europe Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Holy See Iceland Ireland Italy Kosovo Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Montenegro Netherlands North Macedonia Norway Poland Portugal Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Ukraine United Kingdom Oceania Australia Fiji New Zealand Palau Tonga Former Russian Empire Soviet Union Yugoslavia
Multilateral relations Africa Arab world Latin America Oceania Southeast Asia European Union United Nations
Diplomatic history Missions to Imperial China Red seal ships Nanban trade Sakoku Joseon missions to Japan Japanese missions to Joseon Dutch missions to Edo Ryukyuan missions to Edo Foreign relations of Meiji Japan Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Korea China Marcos scandals Prime Ministerial overseas trips
Territorial disputes Japan–Korea Joint Development Zone Kuril Islands dispute Liancourt Rocks dispute Senkaku Islands dispute
Related topics Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs Diplomatic missions of Japan / in Japan Development assistance JICA JOCV Economic relations JETRO JPEPA Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting

Authority control databases: National	Japan 2