Collective Action Problem | Britannica

Game theory

One aspect of the collective action problem is that posed by collective or public goods. A collective good is one that is economically infeasible to exclude people from using. Hence, if a collective good—such as collective wage bargaining for an industry—is provided by an organization such as a trade union, then the fruits of that bargaining will be enjoyed by all workers, not only the trade unionists. Other workers in the industry who gain the wage increases and better working conditions provided by that bargaining will not have to pay the union dues and will free ride upon the activities of the union. In order to encourage workers to join unions, most also provide a whole host of private excludable services, such as legal advice and help during individual disputes with employers, pension schemes, holiday deals, and other such activities. Of course, setting up a union in the first place is also a collective act, and Olson suggested that setting up such organizations requires the activities of entrepreneurs who also see private benefits (such as paid employment or a political career) from forming the union in the first place. Of course, altruistic individuals may also play a part in collective action.

Collective action problems have often been represented by simple game theory. The simple, one-shot “prisoner’s dilemma” game represents a series of more complex situations, where individual rational action leads to a suboptimal outcome. It would be in the interests of both players to cooperate, but they end up not cooperating because they can see the advantages of free riding and fear the dangers of being taken for a ride. It is well known among game theorists that once the two-person game is repeated over and again, there is a multiplicity of stable equilibriums, of which some involve cooperation and some do not. If the game is played by more than two people and network effects are allowed (that is, players can see how others are playing with third parties), then one should expect both cooperation and free riding.

Thus, game theory shows that collective action is indeed a problem. People do not automatically work together to promote their collective interests, but neither is it impossible. Indeed, depending on the conditions, one should expect varying levels of collective action. In other words, there is not a single collective action problem but a host of collective action problems that share common features. Therefore, as one would expect, there are numerous ways in which people learn to overcome the particular collective action problems they face in order to work together. The tedium of organizing a school fete is not the same as the dangers inherent in taking part in collective protest or revolution, but both are collective acts subject to free riding. Described below are the types of demand-side problems that arise in collective action and the sorts of supply-side solutions that are adopted to overcome them. It will be seen that both the problems and the solutions are interlinked and interrelated.

The free-rider problem occurs wherever there is a collective good giving nonexcludability. Nonexcludability entails the free-rider problem because a person can enjoy the benefits of the good without having to pay for it (as long, of course, as the good is provided). A supply-side response is to attempt to convince would-be free riders that if they do not contribute, they will not receive the good, not through exclusion but because the good will not be provided at all.

Access for the whole family! Bundle Britannica Premium and Kids for the ultimate resource destination. Subscribe

However, prior to free riding is the recognition of one’s interests. In economic theory it is usually assumed that people have well-defined preference orderings and, hence, know their own interests. But a great deal is spent on the supply side convincing people that something is in their own interest. In that sense, the first collective action problem is the recognition that people do share interests.

The more homogenous the group, the easier it is to discover any shared preferences, the fewer the cross-cutting cleavages, and, thus, the fewer the sources of conflict within the group. Homogeneity in another sense may work in the opposite direction. If the group is heterogeneous in terms of wealth, then it may be easier to secure collective action, because the rich members may provide the goods and allow poorer members to free ride.