Crises, Alerts, And DEFCONS, 1961-1976 – Part II

The questions that McNamara raised in his memorandum (Document 1) found answers in intensive studies conducted by the Defense Department during July 1961, although whether a non-nuclear response was possible remained contested in NATO circles and elsewhere. This declassified State Department history provides a useful overview of the findings of the studies over which McNamara and other agency heads had presided. The goal was a “more effective deterrent,” in large part through a build-up of conventional military forces. That would include a capability, reached by the end of the year, to move six Army divisions to Western Europe. Other measures included increases in naval strength, such as anti-submarine warfare, increases in SAC ground alert (that were already occurring—See Part I, Document 1), and a greater civil defense effort.

Those and other steps toward a more visible deterrent were at the heart of a major speech that President Kennedy delivered over radio and television on 25 July 1961. While there had been discussion of declaring a national emergency, Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not want to alarm the public, preferring to keep any announcements on a lower key. Upholding the pledges of the U.S. and its allies to safeguard West Berlin, Kennedy announced plans to supplement the military build-up that had begun earlier in the year with a $3.2 billion request to Congress for increases in active-duty strength for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. That would be enabled by a doubling and tripling of draft calls in the coming months. Moreover, of the funds requested, half would be used for the purchase of non-nuclear munitions and equipment. In addition, the U.S. would delay plans for the retirement of B-47 strategic bombers to increase strategic forces. He also called for increases in civil defenses, thus giving impetus to the fall-out shelter craze of this period.

Kennedy declared that the increases in conventional forces would give him better choices between nuclear holocaust and acquiescence to Soviet demands. While West Berlin’s “freedom” and allied access were not negotiable, Kennedy expressed willingness to negotiate with the Soviets to avoid further tensions. He also acknowledged legitimate Soviet interests in the future of Germany by noting Moscow’s “historical concerns about their security in central and Eastern Europe.”

During the weeks that followed, Washington worked closely with the British, French, and West Germans to win support for its military program but also to discuss contingency plans, economic countermeasures, and the timing of negotiations.[8] The latter proved difficult because French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville opposed the U.S. position to call for a Conference of Foreign Ministers before the convening of the UN General Assembly in September. While Rusk argued that key allies and “friends” would be reluctant to support a build-up and countermeasures if negotiations were not in the works, de Murville argued that calling for negotiations would show that fear of war was at “the bottom of [our] hearts.” Showing weakness, de Murville suggested, would also validate Khrushchev’s assumption that the West would not fight and that it would give in to the Soviet position on Berlin. [9]

Believing that Khrushchev would never fight over Berlin but fearing that an insufficiently tough policy could lose West Germany, the French could not be persuaded to support negotiations. Thus, the United States and the British would hold talks with the Soviets during the months ahead. The West German government was also strongly critical of U.S. talks with the Soviets and disagreements turned into a mini-crisis when the Germans leaked U.S. negotiating positions in spring 1962.