Top Most 20+ What Is Intention In Philosophy
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1.Intention (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy)
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2.Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy)
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3.Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy)
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4.Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy)
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5.Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy)
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6.Intention
in·ten·tion / inˈtenchən/ • n. 1.
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7.Intention | Logic
intention, (Latin: intentio), in scholastic logic and psychology, a concept used to describe a mode of being or relation. In knowing, the mind is said to “intend” or “tend toward” its object, and a thing as known, or in the knowing mind, has “intentional being.” Intention may mean either the mind knowing or the knowledge itself, analogous to the use of perception for the act of perceiving or for the thing perceived. First intention is knowledge of a thing as it is in itself; second intention, knowledge of the thing as known. Thus, the term man is in first intention
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8.Error | Harvard University Press
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9.Intention - Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy
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10.Terminology - How Philosophy Defines "intention"? - Philosophy Stack Exchange
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11.Terminology - How Philosophy Defines "intention"? - Philosophy Stack Exchange
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12.Intention Matters - Fact Or Myth?
Intention matters in planning, action, and doing. Attention, intention, and impact are all important components of an action.
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16.Intentions: Philosophical And Empirical Issues - Topoi
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17.Requirements Of Intention In Light Of Belief - Philosophical Studies
Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms (all roughly formulated) include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements.
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18.Watching: Intention In Action | Philosophical Installations
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19.Frontiers | No Intentions In The Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective On The Science Of Intention | Psychology
In their paper 'Why we may not find intentions in the brain', Uithol, Burnston & Haselager (2014) convincingly argue that “the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for.” Their paper could be seen as a critical note to the widespread tendency to search for identifiable neurocorrelates of mental concepts. Their more specific suggestion is that the absence of clear neural correlates undermines the traditional understanding of intention. In this paper I will try to take their argument a step further. First of all, I will argue that our folk psychology leaves room for various understandings of intentions, and that the concept of intention discussed by Uithol et al is an academic concept that has its roots in the causal theory of action and in functionalist approaches to cognition. I will argue that both these paradigms are contested, and that there seems to be theoretical wiggle room for alternative understandings of intention. Subsequently I outline such an alternative perspective based on Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, emphasizing the regulative role of intention talk. However, the proposed understanding raises the question how to think about neural realization: is intention talk 'just' talk, or do intentions really exist? I will propose that intention talk should be understood as a form of pattern recognition, and that the patterns involved are extended in both space and time. The conclusion outlines some important implications for the neuroscientific investigation of intentions.
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20.Collective Intentionality | Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy