Advocate General's Opinion In Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler And ...

Log InSign Up

• Log In
• Sign Up
• more
• • About
  • Press
  • Papers
  • Terms
  • Privacy
  • Copyright
  • We're Hiring!
  • Help Center
  • less

Outline

keyboard_arrow_downTitleAbstractKey TakeawaysFAQsAll TopicsLawInternational Lawdownload

Download Free PDF

Download Free PDFAdvocate General’s Opinion in Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher BundestagEttore Timivisibility

…

description

3 pages

descriptionSee full PDFdownloadDownload PDF deployed_code_updateFull PDF Package more_vert more_vert close

Sign up for access to the world's latest research

Sign up for freearrow_forwardcheckGet notified about relevant paperscheckSave papers to use in your researchcheckJoin the discussion with peerscheckTrack your impact

Abstract

According to Advocate General Cruz Villalón, the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme is compatible, in principle, with the TFEU.

... Read more

Key takeaways

AI

1. The Advocate General finds the OMT programme compatible with TFEU, contingent on adherence to proportionality principles.
2. The ECB's OMT programme is deemed an unconventional monetary policy measure, requiring careful justification and compliance.
3. The BVerfG questions whether the OMT programme oversteps into economic policy, potentially exceeding the ECB's mandate.
4. Implementation of the OMT must ensure a real market price for government bonds, avoiding direct monetary financing.
5. The OMT programme can reduce bond interest rates, aiding financial normalization in euro area States.

Related papers

How the ECB reinterpreted its mandate during the euro-crisis (...and why it was right in doing so)Susanna Cafaro

1. Introduction 2. ECB’s tasks and competences; 3. The intervention of the ECB in the Eurocrisis; 4. Legitimacy of the interventions and conditions attached to it; 5. The unclear borders of monetary policy; 6. Is the activity of central banking “political”?

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe government bond buying programmes of the European Central Bank: an analysis of their policy settingsManuela Moschella

This article investigates why the European Central Bank's (ECB's) unconventional monetary policies were relatively modest during the crisis, focusing specifically on the design of its government bond purchase programmes. Building from available explanations of the ECB's behaviour in the political science and public policy literature, we extrapolate a number of testable propositions with a view to helping to account for the specific features of the policies under investigation. These propositions build from scholarly works that emphasize three distinct fundamentals of the ECB's behaviour: legal; doctrinal; and institutional. We then provide evidence supporting our propositions by evaluating the ECB's policy settings during the crisis. In addition, we identify other factors that have shaped the design of the ECB's bond buying policies, namely the ECB's conception of its own independence.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe Role of Courts in Economic Governance in the European UnionTamara Capeta

Towards a new Government of the Economy in the European Union, Carrera Hernández, F.J. (Dir.),ed. ARANZADI, ISBN: 978-84-9177-284-2, 2018

This paper asks the question whether the courts have a role in shaping economic policy decisions at the EU level. It analyses which types of “economic” cases reached the courts during the financial crisis in the EU, and to what extent and with which arguments Member States' courts and the CJEU agreed to participate in shaping economic policy decisions. The paper discusses the effects and desirability of the courts’ participation in economic governance, and concludes that, whether or not one approves this, the Courts are today inevitable part of economic governance. Shift from international instruments as a means of addressing the euro crisis to the EU-based instruments will not eliminate judicialisation of economic governance. If, for instance, fiscal policy becomes more communitarianised, this will not change judicial involvement, it would just change the level of the courts involved: from national courts to the CJEU. This can, arguably, also change the outcome of judicial decisions, but not the involvement of courts in economic decisions.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe European Stability Mechanism through the legal meanderings of the Union's constitutionalism: comment on Pringle Stanislas Adam, Francisco Javier Mena Parras

In its judgment in Pringle , delivered on November 27, 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union upheld the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism through the conclusion of an international agreement by Euro Area Member States. Beyond its implications for the Union’s economic and monetary policy, this landmark judgment offers food for thought on a series of central issues in EU constitutional law, including the scope of the simplified revision procedure in art.48(6) TEU or Member State co-operation and the use of EU institutions outside the EU legal order. It also constitutes a unique illustration of multi-level dialogue in the European Union in the post-Lisbon era.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightARTICLES THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB) AS A CATALYST FOR CHANGE IN EU LAW. PART 1: THE ECB'S MANDATESJavier Solana, David Ramos Muñoz

The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has evidenced the shortcomings of financial supervision and regulation in the EU. In the summer of 2012, at the height of the crisis, and in the absence of a clear protector of financial stability in the Eurozone, it was the bold pledge of the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) to do " whatever it takes to preserve the euro " that managed to restrain contagion. But did the ECB really have the power to act as the safeguard of financial stability in the Eurozone? EU Policy makers have reacted to those shortcomings by introducing deeply transformative changes in financial regulation. The birth of the Banking Union might be the paramount example. In the institutional landscape arising from the Banking Union, the European Central Bank (ECB) stands as a central player, especially as the competent authority for the prudential supervision of the most significant credit institutions in the Eurozone. Yet, the scope of its new powers as the guardian of financial stability is unclear. For example, in the event of another financial crisis, could the ECB provide financial assistance to credit institutions facing liquidity problems as a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)? In this paper, we look at the ECB's core mandates in the Treaties to delineate the scope of those new powers. Unlike monetary policy, financial stability is not a core mandate of the ECB under the TFEU. We begin by exploring whether the ECB could perform LOLR functions within its core mandates; particularly, within its mandate of monetary policy. For that, we delve into the recent decision of the CJEU in

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightWaibel Bruges EMU Exclusive Only in Name 10 February (f).docxMichael Waibel

Monetary policy for those Members whose currency is the Euro is one of European Union’s few formally exclusive competences. Yet despite formal allocation of monetary policy competence to the Union, this chapter argues that the practice of monetary policy decision-making reflects the EU’s nation-state structure. It tells us one side of the story about the balance of power for the conduct of monetary policy. If exclusive competence at bottom means that member states have no say in devising policy, then monetary policy, is not at present a genuinely exclusive competence. Instead, the chapter contends that monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the EU in name only. At the very least, the position is more nuanced than the label of exclusive competence suggests. The first section compares competence for monetary policy with related areas, specifically economic policy, and closely connected thereto, education, health, labour and social policy. It also briefly discussed how the Eurozone crisis has affected the vertical balance of responsibilities between the EU and its member states in these areas. The second section examines the asymmetric allocation of competence for economic and monetary policy, and the fuzzy boundary between the two, through the prism of the two key Eurozone crisis cases before the CJEU, Pringle and Gauweiler. The third section examines why, contrary to first appearances, the EU does not at present have a genuine exclusive competence for monetary policy.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightMonetary Policy in the EU: An Exclusive Competence Only in Name?Michael Waibel

2017

Monetary policy for those Members whose currency is the Euro is one of European Union's few formally exclusive competences. Yet despite formal allocation of monetary policy competence to the Union, this chapter argues that the practice of monetary policy decision-making reflects the EU's nation-state structure. It tells us one side of the story about the balance of power for the conduct of monetary policy. If exclusive competence at bottom means that member states have no say in devising policy, then monetary policy, is not at present a genuinely exclusive competence. Instead, the chapter contends that monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the EU in name only. At the very least, the position is more nuanced than the label of exclusive competence suggests. The first section compares competence for monetary policy with related areas, specifically economic policy, and closely connected thereto, education, health, labour and social policy. It also briefly discussed how the Eurozone crisis has affected the vertical balance of responsibilities between the EU and its member states in these areas. The second section examines the asymmetric allocation of competence for economic and monetary policy, and the fuzzy boundary between the two, through the prism of the two key Eurozone crisis cases before the CJEU, Pringle and Gauweiler. The third section examines why, contrary to first appearances, the EU does not at present have a genuine exclusive competence for monetary policy.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightEurozone Crisis Management, Citizenship Rights and the Global Reach of EU Data Protection Law: EU Legal Developments in 2015Thomas Horsley

Eurozone Crisis Management, Citizenship Rights and the Global Reach of EU Data Protection Law: EU Legal Developments in 2015

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightWhatever it Takes vs Whatever is Legal: The ECB's problematic relationship with the rule of lawIoannis Glinavos

The paper offers a reflection on how the ECB approaches its mandate and tests how well its key crisis-response policies and initiatives rest within a framework of law. It is argued that there are limits to doing 'whatever it takes', even when things are considered economically necessary. The Union is based on a foundation of law and excessive discretion, warranted though it may be, can undermine the whole basis of the European project. The paper offers a discussion drawing examples from the ECB's interventions in markets and its decisions in relation to Greece, as a response to the European debt crisis. The paper then moves on to examine the nature of the ECB's independence within the institutional structures of the EU and to define how the concept of the rule of law is understood within the European institutional setting. The investigation ends by exploring the tensions between European law, institutional decision making and national constitutional law, by looking at the backlash against the expansion of ECB competences in Germany. The paper ultimately argues that doing the right thing is not necessarily compatible with doing the legal thing. The ECB may not have been currently found to violate its mandate, but the link between economic criteria, such as conditionality, and legality (as determined by recent German challenges to Mario Draghi's choices) is an unsteady platform from which to defend the rule of law in Europe.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe role of the ECB in economic policy makingDaphnie Ploegstra

Daphnie Ploegstra (3960374) Capita Selecta Economic and Monetary Union mr. dr. Ton van den Brink Word count: 2891

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightSee full PDFdownloadDownload PDF

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

FAQs

AI

What are the consequences of the OMT program on Eurozone government bond yields?add

The Advocate General considers the OMT program suitable for reducing government bond interest rates, potentially restoring financial normality to member states.

How does the OMT program's implementation affect monetary financing prohibitions in the TFEU?add

The Advocate General finds the OMT program compatible with TFEU, provided it allows market price formation for government bonds.

What criteria must unconventional monetary policy measures like OMT adhere to?add

According to the Advocate General, unconventional measures must comply with primary law provisions and the principle of proportionality.

What limitations does the ECB face in implementing the OMT program?add

Implementation must avoid direct involvement in member state financial assistance programs to maintain its monetary policy character.

Why did the BVerfG reference the CJEU regarding the OMT program?add

The BVerfG questioned whether the OMT is a monetary policy or economic policy measure beyond ECB's mandate.

Ettore TimiUniversità degli Studi di Firenze (University of Florence), UndergraduateaddFollowmailMessagePapers7Followers74View all papers from Ettore Timiarrow_forward

Related papers

The European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the Prohibition of Monetary Financing and Sovereign Debt Restructuring ScenariosSebastian Grund

While many central banks around the world pursued quantitative easing programs in recent years responding to the weak inflation outlook, the ECB faces unique legal constraints with respect to its Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) launched in 2015. Most importantly, due to the prohibition of monetary financing enshrined in art.123 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the ECB may find itself in an – for the ECB - unprecedented position of a creditor participating in a sovereign debt restructuring and facing legal constraints in accepting any debt cut on its sovereign bond holdings. Against this backdrop, this article shines a light on the potential legal options available to the ECB, should another debt crisis in the euro area materialise. For this purpose, we will also take a closer look at two seminal judgements by European Courts, delineating the legal boundaries in which the ECB may conduct its non-standard monetary policy.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe impossible constitutional reconciliation of the BVerfG and the ECJ in the OMT case. A legal analysis of the first preliminary referral of the BVerfGFrancesco Pennesi

In Gauweiler v. ECB, the German Constitutional Court referred for the first time a case to the European Court of Justice. The BVerfG openly doubted the legality of the OMT program of the European Central Bank, one of the most effective European instruments in counteracting the effects of the Euro-crisis. Despite the apparent willingness of the BVerfG to accept the referring decision of the ECJ, it is clear that the German judges have a different constitutional interpretation of the monetary mandate of the ECB. This article will focus on the different conceptions of European Monetary Union and in particular of the ECB proposed by the two Supreme Courts in their case-law, and will explain why the legality of the ECB’s activity will be re-examined in the near future.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightAn Analysis of the OMT Case from an EU Law PerspectiveAntonio Luca Riso

On 14 January 2014 the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) held a decision to refer for the first time a case to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling, pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and addressed to the CJEU a series of questions regarding the compatibility of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) programme announced by the ECB with EU law. In this article, it is maintained that the monetary policy transmission mechanism not only allows but sometimes requires a central bank to intervene in the government bonds markets. According to this analysis, the ECB mandate is wide enough to include the implementation of measures such as the OMT. The subject matter of the case requires a prior understanding of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the role in this context of government bond markets: paragraph 2 is thus devoted to the attempt to shed some clarity on these highly technical issues, which certainly pertain more to the domain of economics, rather than to that of law. Paragraph 3 and 4 are instead devoted to the analysis of the two questions of law raised by the BVerfG in the present case, relating to the scope of the ECB monetary policy mandate, and to the (alleged infringement of the) prohibition of monetary financing principle. Paragraph 5 concludes. Published in the IMFS Interdisciplinary Studies in Monetary and Financial Stability 1/2015 "The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions in the Courts", edited by Helmut Siekmann, Vikrant Vig and Volker Wieland, available at the following link: http://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Interdisc_Studies/IMFS_Interdisc_Studies__2015_1_OMT.pdf Also available in SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549505

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightDevelopments Saving Face? The German Federal Constitutional Court Decides GauweilerGeorgios Anagnostaras

The German Federal Constitutional Court has issued its long-awaited judgment in the Gauweiler Case. The ruled that the policy decision on the Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT programme) does not manifestly exceed the competences attributed to the European Central Bank (ECB) and does not manifestly violate the prohibition of monetary financing of the budget, if interpreted in accordance with the preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice (Court).

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe Role of the European Central Bank in the Euro crisis: An Assessment of the ECB's Non-standard Policies in Light of Its Mandate and Scope for AccountabilityLeon PloegstradownloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightThe German Federal Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Another Step towards National Closure? Dagmar Schiek

German Law Journal, 2014

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany’s participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This case note discusses three aspects of this decision. First, it considers the aims of challenging the youngest measures to contain the euro currency crisis before the FCC, focusing on the question in how far the claims are based on national closure as opposed to an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. Secondly it analyzes in how far the aims the claims pursue are reflected in the FCC’s response. Thirdly, it considers the substantive relevance of this reference, highlighting the surprisingly vague consequences the FCC envisages should the CJEU not re-interpret the OMT decision as the FCC suggests, and illuminating the strategic aims of the reference without deference. In conclusion, it sketches the remaining scope for the EU to engage in or at least facilitate transnational solidarity.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightFrom Transparency to Ambiguity: the Impact of the ECB’s Unconventional Policies on the EMU (Journal of European Integration, 2016)Arie Krampf

2016

There is no disagreement that during the crisis the EMU has gone through an institutional change. However, there is no agreement concerning the type of change and its drivers. This article focuses on the impact of the ECB’s unconventional policies on the EMU at large. The article draws on the historical institutional theory of gradual change, and argues that the ECB policies led to process of conversion and displacement in the EMU. The article concludes, therefore, that during the crisis the EMU was not simply ‘completed’ but it had its institutional path altered.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightECB independence and accountability today: towards a (necessary) redefinition?Dermine Paul, Klaus Tuori, Diane Fromage

Maastricht Journal Special issue: The ECB's accountability in a multilevel European order, 2019

This introductory article sets the ground for the analysis performed in the articles included in this Special Issue. It shows why a new analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s accountability is required by referring to recent developments, and by underlining how much the ECB's role and standing have changed since its creation 20 years ago. Indeed, its resorting to unconventional monetary policies in response to the recent economic and financial crisis, as well as the creation of the Banking Union, have significantly affected the ECB. This introduction also recalls the main elements of the debate on the balance between accountability and independence, and shows how this balance has evolved. On the basis of the findings of the articles included in this Special Issue, some conclusions and hypotheses as to the way forward are formulated.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightM. Moschella and D. Lombardi (2015), ‘The Government Bond Buying Programmes of the European Central Bank: An Analysis of their Policy Settings’, Journal of European Public PolicyManuela Moschella

ABSTRACT This article investigates why the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) unconventional monetary policies were relatively modest during the crisis, focusing specifically on the design of its government bond purchase programmes. Building from available explanations of the ECB’s behaviour in the political science and public policy literature, we extrapolate a number of testable propositions with a view to helping to account for the specific features of the policies under investigation. These propositions build from scholarly works that emphasize three distinct funda- mentals of the ECB’s behaviour: legal; doctrinal; and institutional. We then provide evidence supporting our propositions by evaluating the ECB’s policy settings during the crisis. In addition, we identify other factors that have shaped the design of the ECB’s bond buying policies, namely the ECB’s conception of its own independence. KEY WORDS Balance sheet policies; European Central Bank; global financial crisis; policy settings; unconventional monetary policies.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightInternational Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished DebateAbadir Ibrahim

One should conceive of the relationship between world trade and human rights in a tension that is fundamental but one that can also be significantly minimized through accommodation, convergence and inter-penetration. It is conceivable that solutions that are acceptable to the majority of political participants in the international community can be reached. This comment argues that the relationship between human rights and international trade is not and should not be a zero-sum game in which one’s gain is necessarily seen as the other’s loss. The comment begins with an explanation of what is at the core of the tension between the two regimes and will go on to explain (or at least make a proposal on) how this tension could be negotiated for optimum outcomes for both regimes.

downloadDownload free PDFView PDFchevron_rightkeyboard_arrow_downView more papers

Related topics

European Union LawaddFollow

EU Monetary PolicyaddFollow

• Explore
• Papers
• Topics

• Features
• Mentions
• Analytics
• PDF Packages
• Advanced Search
• Search Alerts

• Journals
• Academia.edu Journals
• My submissions
• Reviewer Hub
• Why publish with us
• Testimonials

• Company
• About
• Careers
• Press
• Help Center
• Terms
• Privacy
• Copyright
• Content Policy

580 California St., Suite 400San Francisco, CA, 94104© 2026 Academia. All rights reserved